**Being and Time** – Martin Heidegger

Terminology

Dasein (*lit. there being*) – Heidegger’s name for the human being separating human *being* from the Being of other beings

Ontic – The state of individual beings i.e. particular instances of Being

Ontological – Pertaining to Being itself

Pre-ontological – The character of Dasein wherein it’s Being is fundamentally ontological even though it doesn’t have an explicit understanding of ontology

Existentiell – refers to the understanding we get of Existence through the particular life a given Dasein lives out (existence itself). This in turn determines a given Dasein’s *ontic* state.

Existential – The structure of Being itself; the structures which make any and all *existentiell* understandings possible

Existence (*Existenz*) – the Being to which Dasein always already relates as a fundamental character of its Being

Facticity – Dasein seen as something objectively present

Objective presence (Present-at-hand) – one of the two ways of Being of beings unlike Dasein (Reality)

Handiness (Ready-to-hand) – the other of the two ways of Being of beings unlike Dasein

Existentials – characteristics of Being of Dasein

Categories – characteristics of Being of beings unlike Dasein

Phenomenon – “what shows itself in itself”

Logos – “lets something be seen”

Phenomenology – to “let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself”

Hermeneutic Phenomenology – Phenomenology as an interpretative exercise, since we are always already in-the-world we are therefore *interpreting* Being rather than observing it from an imaginary perspective-less point

Authenticity – A mode of Being of Dasein in which Dasein “belongs to itself.” This means that Dasein chooses for itself its own possibilities of Being.

Inauthenticity – A mode of Being of Dasein in which Dasein has lost itself. This means that Dasein allows the they to dictate its possibilities. This does not signify a “lesser” or “lower” degree of Being, “inauthenticity can determine Dasein even in its fullest concretion, when it is busy, excited, interested, and capable of pleasure.” (p.42)

Average everydayness – A mode of Being in which Dasein relates to it’s Being through an ontically indifferent mode. Heidegger specifies this mode as the starting point for the investigation because it is only through such an undifferentiated mode of Being (one in which there is no concrete possible idea of existence) that we can gain insights into Being as it truly is. (This is an *inauthentic* mode of Being)

Worldly – Refers to the ontic, factical kind of Being of Dasein (Dasein’s environment)

Innerworldly – The kind of Being of a being unlike Dasein

Worldliness – The ontological, existential Being of world

Temporal – The meaning of Being as devolved from time

Historicity – A temporal mode of the Being of Dasein (historicity is therefore prior to history (world-historical occurrences)

Introduction

*The Question of Being*

Heidegger starts out suggesting that the question of Being has not only been forgotten but is, these days, considered unimportant or superfluous for three main reasons:

* “Being” is the most “universal” concept (but this doesn’t mean it is the most clearly understood)
* The concept of “Being” is indefinable (this only means that “Being” is not a being itself and therefore can’t be defined by attributes like other beings)
* “Being” is a self-evident concept (even though we all have some ‘intuitive’ understanding of “Being” we don’t know it conceptually)

*What is a Questioning?*

There are three elements to any questioning. An enquiry:

1. Is an enquiry about something, therefore it must have some preconception about what is sought (Being)
2. Involves the interrogation of some entity or body of evidence (since Being is always the Being of beings, it is beings which will be interrogated)
3. Ends in a conclusion; the discovery (the meaning of Being)

*Priorities of the Question of Being*

Ontological – The question of Being aims at the ontologies which precede the ontic sciences and which they are founded upon.

Ontic – The only way we can investigate the question of Being is through Dasein and its ontic form of existence (which is nevertheless defined in its Being by existence)

*The Priority of Dasein*

First, since all aspects of this investigation are necessarily modes of the Being of Dasein (i.e. there is no such thing as a presupposition-less starting point), we must first investigate the Being of this being called Dasein.

In addition to this, Dasein is a being that is concerned in its Being about its very Being (it confronts its own existence as something to be worked out) – thus it has a relation of being to Being – thus it understands itself in terms of its own existence (Being). Another way to say this is that Dasein’s essence lies in existence; for it alone existence is a question that can only be addressed by existing.

Dasein takes priority over other kinds of being for three reasons:

1. Ontic – every ontic or *existentiell* state of Dasein is defined in its Being by Existence
2. Ontological – On the basis of (1), Dasein *is* ontological
3. Ontic-ontological – is capable of an understanding of the Being of beings unlike itself

*A Vicious Circle*

In order to work out the question of Being we have to interrogate beings themselves – i.e. make them transparent in their Being – and since interrogating is a mode of Being of humans, that being we have to investigate is us.

This isn’t a circle because a) formal objections like this are always “sterile” (we have to approach Being as a particular kind of being so there is no such thing as a presupposition-less perspective, i.e. Dasein) and b) Dasein is already determined in its Being even though the meaning of Being isn’t explicitly available.

*Phenomenology*

Differs from Husserl’s in a couple of ways including:

1. Husserl treated consciousness as the object (the *what*) of phenomenology; Heidegger rejects the idea that phenomenology has any object. For Heidegger, phenomenology is the *how* of philosophical research, not the *what* of the content of such research.
2. Husserl’s phenomenological reduction screens off distracting things such as other beings but for Heidegger, Being is always the Being of beings so we need to go to directly to beings in order to understand Being itself. Not only this, but Dasein’s being-in-the-world, as a being concerned with other beings, is not an optional add-on, something we can adopt and suspend at will. Dasein is *necessarily* and *fundamentally* in-the-world

Phenomena can be phenomenon (a self-showing), semblance (a showing as a thing it is *not*), appearance (something which does not show itself announces itself through another thing which does show itself, e.g. a symptom of a disease), or mere appearance (self-showing which indicates the permanently non-manifest).

Three forms of phenomenon:

1. Formal – a self-showing which is not specified in any way
2. Vulgar (ordinary) – a self-showing which understands the beings addressed
3. Phenomenological – what is prior to and always accompanies phenomena in the second sense (e.g. categorial structures like space and time)

Logos means ‘discourse’ as in to ‘let be seen’ what one is talking about

Phenomenology therefore means to “let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself” in other words, “To the things themselves!” Phenomenology lets the thing which is always *covered up* (namely, being) be seen, hence, “*Ontology is possible only as phenomenology*.”

Division One: The Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein

Chapter One

*Objective Presence vs. Existenz*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Objective PresenceThings unlike Dasein (a *what*)Characteristics are attributesNeither indifferent nor non-indifferent to its BeingCharacteristics – categories | ExistenzDasein (a *who*)Characteristics are the possible ways for it to beConcerned in its Being about its Being, and this Being is always my ownCharacteristics – existentials Dasein is always essentially its possibility; it doesn’t “have” it as an attribute of something objectively present. It is because of this that Dasein can “win” or “lose” itself (be authentic or inauthentic) |

*Descartes and Science*

Heidegger criticises Descartes for failing to investigate the *sum* even as he investigated the *cogito*. Starting from a given *ego* and subject completely ignores the more fundamental, phenomenal content of Dasein.

He also points out that the sciences, as a “syncretistic comparison and classification” (p.51) cannot give us genuine knowledge. Science orders the manifold without providing real understanding because there is always something phenomenal ‘beneath’ and ‘presupposed’ in the ordering. This more primordial manifold, Heidegger identifies as “world”.

Chapter Two

*Being-in-the-World in General*

Being-in-the-World is a unified phenomenon and must always be thought of in this way. It is also an “*a priori* necessary constitution of Dasein” (p.54).

*Being-in (a brief overview)*

Being-in doesn’t mean anything like being present *in* or present together *with* other beings. Ontologically, these are categorial characteristics of objectively present beings. Being-in as it relates to the Being of the being called Dasein means “to dwell near…, [or] to be familiar with…” (p.55). It is a “being together with” the world, in the sense of being absorbed in the world, as opposed to a “being next to each other” of objectively present beings. Only beings like Dasein can ‘touch’ other beings, in the existential sense of *encountering* them. Objectively present beings are *worldless*.

Being-in is not a “property” which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes lacks. Dasein is *always already* absorbed in the world in the way of Being-in.

*Facticity*

Dasein can also be thought of as in the world in a merely objectively present way, however this factual objective presence is fundamentally different from the factuality of objectively present beings and is not derived by simply disregarding the specific existentials of Dasein. Heidegger calls this *facticity* and asserts that it always presupposes, and is built upon, the existential nature of Dasein. Facticity cashes out as a kind of limiting factor on Dasein’s possibilities.

*Taking Care*

Dasein can exist in a number of ways of Being-in (to use, to accomplish, etc.) and all of these ways of being-in have the kind of Being of *taking care of*. *Deficient* modes of Being-in (neglecting, omitting, etc.) also come under the existential of taking care of.

*Knowing*

Heidegger rejects the Cartesian idea of knowledge being a relation between an inner ‘subject’ and an outer‘object’. Rather, Dasein is always already ‘outside’ in the world together with other beings. Dasein is always already in the world in the mode of taking care of.

Heidegger seems to distinguish between two kinds of knowledge as follows:

1. Phenomenological knowing: This is a way of knowing which stems from Dasein’s handling, using, and taking care of other beings in the world. Heidegger calls this a “phenomenal interpretation… [which] is not a cognition of existent qualities of beings, but rather a determination of the structure of their Being.” (p.67)
2. Ontic (scientific) knowing: This also stems from the taking care of of Dasein, but in a deficient mode (refraining from handling, using, etc.) Heidegger calls this “lingering with” which cashes out as a “looking at” or *perception* of something objectively present. Perception becomes *definition*, which is then capable of being expressed in propositions which can be maintained and preserved (knowledge). *Knowing is therefore a mode of Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, in which Dasein gains a new perspective of Being towards a world always already discovered in Dasein.* This kind of knowledge therefore arises from a *deficiency* of the mode of ‘taking care’.

Chapter Three: In-the-World (The Worldliness of the World)

In this chapter, Heidegger explores the world from a phenomenological or ontological perspective. This is what he means by the expression “the worldliness of the world”. It denotes the ontological structure of the world, as opposed to the ontic. “Innerworldly” is a term he reserves to refer exclusively to the ontology of objectively present beings whereas the term “worldly” (as in “worldliness”) refers to the structure of the world itself, which will turn out to be a kind of being of Dasein.

*Beings Encountered in the Surrounding World*

The beings at hand Dasein encounters in the world in taking care are called *useful things*. He proceeds to draw out the kind of Being of useful things by examining their utility:

1. Referential totality – This is the constitution of useful things. There is no such thing as *a* useful thing; each useful thing always belongs to a referential (equipmental) totality. This “totality of useful things is always already discovered *before* the individual useful thing.” (p.68)
2. “In-order-to” – Each useful thing is characterised by a relation Heidegger calls the “in order to” (e.g. serviceability, helpfulness, usability, handiness, etc.) which is basically what the thing is for; e.g. a hammer is for hammering.

These considerations yield the Being of useful beings, which is *handiness*. This Being is revealed not when we just stare at the thing but when we take hold of it and use it (encounter it). Heidegger contrasts this kind of ‘seeing’ with the passive staring mentioned earlier, by terming it *circumspection*.

In order for useful things to actually be handy, they ‘withdraw’ in their handiness; everyday dealings are primarily concerned not with tools themselves but with the work undertaken using them. Heidegger examines the referential structure of work in the same way as he analysed useful things highlighting three aspects:

1. *What-for* – This refers to the work that is actually to be produced and has the kind of Being of a useful thing; e.g. a shoe is *for* wearing and a clock is *for* telling time.
2. *Whereof* – This is a using *of* something for something and points to the materials that make up the useful thing. Nature is revealed in this way; e.g. a shoe is made of leather, rubber, etc.
3. A reference to the user of the tools and the consumer of the product – Through this reference, work refers not just to more beings at hand, but beings with the kind of Being of Dasein.

Heidegger emphasises that world is encountered as the world in which users and consumers live. The domestic world of the “workshop” is revealed but so is the public world and the surrounding world of nature, e.g. public lighting systems take darkness into account.

Here, Heidegger cautions that the handiness of useful things is not a characteristic imposed on beings which we encounter in the world. It is not a simple “subjective colouring” of objectively present stuff. If this were true it would mean that beings would have to be understood first as purely objectively present but this contradicts Heidegger’s interpretation of cognition as a *founded* mode of being-in-the-world.

*The Worldly Character of the Surrounding World Announcing Itself in Innerworldly Beings*

Heidegger claims that the worldly character of innerworldly beings withdraws when they are encountered in the various modes of taking care, but appears when they show up as unhandy in some way:

1. *Conspicuousness* – This occurs when a being that is unusable for one reason or another is encountered in taking care.
2. *Obtrusiveness* – This occurs when a being is missing; i.e. not at hand at all.
3. *Obstinacy* – This refers to the situation when a being “gets in the way” of taking care of things.

The above (deficient or privative) modes of taking care bring “to the fore the character of objective presence in what is at hand.” (p.73)

The structure of being of what is at hand as a useful thing is determined by *references* (the in-order-to to a what-for). When beings show up as unhandy, this amounts to a *disruption of reference*, in which the reference becomes explicit to circumspection.

In this way, “Being-in-the-world signifies the unthematic, circumspect absorption in the references constitutive for the handiness of the totality of useful things. Taking care of things always already occurs on the basis of a familiarity with the world.” (p.75)

*Reference and Signs*

Heidegger then goes on to flesh out an ontological analysis of reference. He finds a useful thing as regards reference in *signs*. Signs are a kind of useful thing whose character consists in *indicating*. Indicating, in turn, is a kind of referring, where to refer means to *relate*.

This can all be illustrated as follows and demonstrates the “formal, universal character of relation” (p.76):

Relation

Reference

Indicating

However, indicating things (signs), as useful things, do not find their ontological structure in referring. All useful things find their ontological grounding in the Being of useful things, i.e. the in-order-to structure we saw earlier (specifically, in serviceability for). The specific referral of indicating is rather “the ontic concretion of the what-for of serviceability” (p.77).

This all builds to Heidegger’s pronouncement that signs are not really comprehended when we just stare at them (this applies to all things) as things which stand in an indicating relationship to other things. Rather, phenomenologically speaking, signs are encountered in circumspect, heedful dealings that explicitly reveal the surrounding world. Signs let what is at hand be encountered, they are “*useful things which explicitly bring a totality of useful things to circumspection so that the worldly character of what is at hand makes itself known at the same time.*” (p.78)

Heidegger concludes this section on signs by identifying three ways signs are related to reference:

1. As an ontic concretion of the ontological structure of the Being of useful things, indicating is grounded on the reference in-order-to (specifically the what-for of serviceability)
2. As the character of useful things at hand, indicating belongs to a totality of useful things, a referential context
3. As handy things, signs make the surrounding world explicitly accessible to circumspection.

“*A sign is something ontically at hand which, as this definite useful thing, functions at the same time as something which indicates the ontological structure of handiness, referential totality, and worldliness*.” (p.81)

*Relevance and Significance*

Heidegger says the character of Being of things at hand is relevance (or “involvement”) and to be relevant means to let something be together with something else. It refers to the way useful things are “together with…” other beings or “involved in…” a task, which have a particular end in mind. This is an ontological determination of the Being of these beings. Of course, the total relevance must be considered as a unified totality, which Heidegger says is “earlier” than any single useful thing.

This total relevance is always relevance to a what-for that no longer has relevance (no further involvement), because it is not a being that has the Being of things at hand. It is instead a being defined as Being-in-the-world. “The primary “what-for” is a for-the-sake-of-which” (p.83), i.e. Dasein.

These totalities of relevance (involvement) are always grounded in Dasein (everything is eventually for Dasein) and this is why Heidegger claims that the world is a facet of Dasein; Dasein’s Being is Being-in-the-world.

*Understanding* discloses the relations discussed thus far and Heidegger calls the relational character of these referential relations, *signifying*. The relational totality is called *significance* and constitutes the structure of the Being of the world:

* The for-the-sake-of-which (‘for’ Dasein) signifies an in-order-to (the referential totality of useful things)
* The in-order-to signifies a what-for (the work produced with the useful things)
* The what-for signifies a what-in of letting something be relevant
* The what-in signifies a what-with of relevance

“In being familiar with this significance and previously understanding it, Dasein lets things at hand be encountered as things discovered in their relevance. The referential context of significance is anchored in the being of Dasein toward its ownmost being – therefore it cannot have relevance, it is rather being *for the sake of which* Dasein itself is as it is.” (p.120)

Heidegger concludes this section by summarising the three kinds of Being that exist in the world:

1. The Being of the innerworldly beings initially encountered (handiness)
2. The Being of beings (objective presence) that is discovered by going through beings initially encountered
3. The Being of the ontic condition of the possibility of discovering innerworldly beings in general, i.e. the worldliness of the world, i.e. the Being of Dasein

It is only Dasein’s familiarity with significance (outlined above) that lets innerworldly beings be discovered in the world. Without Dasein, these innerworldly beings could not be discovered in the relational totality that culminates in a Being of relevance (handiness) and through this, their Being-in-itself (objective presence).

Heidegger’s endpoint here is that worldliness itself belongs to the constitution of Being of Dasein. In other words, without Dasein, significance (the structure of the world) could never be understood and therefore there would be no world.

*Criticism of Descartes’ Conception of World*

World as *res extensa* – Descartes divides the world into two substances, *res cogitanes* and *res corporea*. To progress from here Descartes needs to provide an ontological explication of substance as it pertains to these two substances. He says that substances are accessible through their attributes and every substance has a pre-eminent property which describes it. For *res corporea* this property turns out to be extension, which is attributed to the corporeal thing.

Ontology of World – Substance for Descartes is characterised by not needing anything else to exist. Once in existence, it endures. However, Descartes identifies three substances, God, thinking thing, and extended thing, and fails to distinguish how the Being of these three beings (substances) is different. Not only that, he declares that the meaning of substance is undiscoverable by us. So to sum up, the ontological foundations of *res extensa* are located in something called substance which remains unexplained and indeed, inexplicable.

Discussion – Descartes holds that the kind of Being of Dasein through which we can gain access to the Being of world lies in knowing, in the sense of the kind of knowledge we find in mathematics and physics. Descartes never allows the world to reveal itself to him, rather he dictates to it its Being, based on the idea of Being as constant presence. In short, Descartes predefines Being ontologically as constant objective presence, which mathematical knowledge is perfectly suited to describe.

Beings do not show themselves through our senses, yet that is the only way Descartes seeks to describe them. Descartes turned the question of the world into nothing more than the thingliness of nature as an innerworldly being which is initially accessible.

On top of all this, he also understands the Being of Dasein as the same kind of Being as *res extensa*.

*Spatiality of Innerworldly Things at Hand*

Things at hand have the character of *nearness*, which is nothing to do with distance but is determined by the handling and use that Dasein circumspectly ‘calculates’ (i.e. for a practical purpose). The “whereto” of the possible belonging somewhere of useful things is called *region*. Regions aren’t first formed by objectively present things in the same ‘space’, rather objectively present things are always already at hand in regions.

As always, the handiness of each region remains undiscovered in circumspect heedful dealings but only reveals itself in the deficient mode of taking care of conspicuousness.

*The Spatiality of Being-in-the-World (Dasein)*

Spatiality as it relates to Dasein cannot be understood as either being found at a position in space (objective presence) or being at hand in a place (useful things). Dasein is “in” the world in the sense of a familiar and heedful dealing with the beings encountered, hence Dasein is spatial on the basis of Being-in. And the spatiality of Being-in is described by *de-distancing* and *directionality*.

De-distancing is a circumspect approaching, not in the sense of moving closer, but in the sense of bringing something *near* as supplying, having, or having at hand. Heidegger’s example is the radio which de-distances the world. De-distancing is also not an attribute of Dasein, it is an existential which means that Dasein *is* de-distancing.

All remoteness/nearness is expressed by Dasein (at least initially) in imprecise terms because everything that is encountered is encountered in circumspect, heedful everydayness, not in the objectively present manner of an “eternal spectator exempt from Dasein.” (p.103) Heidegger goes so far as to say that knowledge of the objective distances of objectively present beings is blind. It contains no meaning at all.

Heidegger rejects the claim that his notion of spatiality is subjective on the grounds that it is neither arbitrary nor “subjectivistic”; Dasein doesn’t de-distance without reason or haphazardly and things are still as they are “in themselves” irrespective of how we might wish them to be.

In the same way that we tend to overlook useful things (and the more useful they are, the more ‘originally’ we engage with them, the less conspicuous they are) things that are measurably, physically ‘nearest’ to us tend to be the furthest from us in Heidegger’s ‘spatial’, ontological sense. To be near means to be initially at hand for circumspection. Heidegger uses the example of a pair of glasses, which despite being distantially extremely close to us, have been de-distanced so much, in being used, they are in fact further away in the surrounding world than the picture on the wall across from him.

In spatial de-distancing, Dasein also has the character of *directionality*, which means that “every bringing near has always taken a direction in a region beforehand from which what is de-distanced approaches so that it can be discovered with regard to its place.” (p.105) The directions, left and right, are grounded in this directionality, which in turn is determined by Being-in-the-world.

*Summary*

As Being-in-the-world, Dasein has always already discovered a “world”; there cannot be a subject without a world, a perspective-less perspective. This discovering, founded in the worldliness of the world (the Being of the world), is the “freeing of beings for a totality of relevance.” (p.107). This freeing is grounded in significance and is “equiprimordially” a letting something be relevant in a region which de-distances and gives direction. “It is a freeing of the spatial belongingness of things at hand.” (p.107)

Heidegger calls letting innerworldly beings be encountered in the world, giving space or *making room*. It is this that frees things at hand for their spatiality.

*Space*

Space becomes accessible to cognition only on the basis of spatiality. “*Space is neither in the subject nor is the world in space*.” (p.108) Rather, space is “in” the world since it is Being-in-the-world (the Being of Dasein) that has disclosed space. Space cannot be “in” the subject, nor is the subject “in” space, rather Dasein *is* spatial in a primordial sense. It is only because Dasein is spatial in this sense that space discloses itself as *a priori*.

When space is discovered non-circumspectly by just looking at it, places for useful things are just positions for random things, the spatiality of innerworldly things at hand loses its character of relevance, the world loses its character of ‘aroundness’, and the surrounding world becomes the natural world. ““The world” as a totality of useful things at hand is spatialized to become a context of extended things which are merely present.” (p.109)

Chapter Four: Being

*Being-with Others*

Here, Heidegger is looking to answer the existential question, who is Dasein? The first thing to note is that this question is “equiprimordial” with *Being-in-the-world*. In the same way that Dasein is in the world with useful things, it is also in the world with other beings whose kind of Being in the world is the same as Dasein. We call these Others and this manner of Being, *Dasein-with*.

Everything we encounter in the surrounding world points to these Others in some way and Heidegger wants to stress that it is not as something ‘added on’ to a merely objectively present thing but rather as a fundamental part of the world. In encountering these beings (through useful things), Dasein thus frees them in their Being. Of course, the Dasein-with of others can also be encountered “at work”, in their Being-in-the-world. At this time Heidegger says they become ‘thematic’.

Heidegger asserts that this encountering of the Other is not to be seen as an ‘inner’ subject looking out to ‘outer’ objects like itself. Rather, Others does not mean everyone but me, it means “those among whom one also is.” (p.115) “…the world is always already the one that I share with others… Being-in is *being-with* others. The innerworldly being-in-itself of others is *Dasein-with*.” (p.115-116)

Naturally, Being-with is not an ontic determination and has nothing to do with whether Dasein is factically objectively present alone or not. Being-with determines Dasein even when an Other is not factically present, and what’s more, even the Being-alone of Dasein is a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with and could never even be a possibility for Dasein if it wasn’t grounded in the ontological Being-with.

Being-with is not characterised by taking care (this is the Being of Dasein’s circumspect dealings with useful things), rather for Dasein Others are a matter of *concern*. Heidegger identifies two extreme positive modes of concern:

1. Taking away “care” – This involves a *leap in* for the Other, in which Dasein does the Other’s job for him/her so he/she is displaced and becomes dependent and therefore dominated.
2. Giving back “care” – This involves a *leap ahead* of the Other in his “existentiell potentiality-of-being” (p.119) and helps the Other to ‘own’ his/her care. This is an authentic form of concern.

There are many other forms of concern in between these extremes. Heidegger identifies five deficient modes of concern, each of which characterise the average everyday Being-with-one-another:

1. Being-for
2. Being-against
3. Being-without-one-other
4. Passing-one-another-by
5. Not-mattering-to-one-another

Concern is guided by *considerateness* and *tolerance*.

*The Problem of Other Minds*

Next, Heidegger discusses what has become known as the problem of other minds. He outlines the theory to resolve this problem by inference. It is typically thought that since we understand our own minds, we can infer from this that other similar-appearing beings share the same qualities. Heidegger calls this inference, *empathy*. Heidegger rejects this as having little ground to stand on. Not only that, empathy is not a primordial kind of Being; rather, it is only possible on the basis of Dasein’s Being as Being-with.

For Heidegger, this problem is ‘always already’ resolved because the “disclosedness of the Dasein-with of others which belongs to Being-with means that the understanding of others already lies in the understanding of Being of Dasein because its Being is Being-with.” (p.120)

*The They*

Heidegger asserts that in Being-with, constant care is taken over the way one differs from them, although the extent of this concern is unknown to it. This distance between the one and the Other, Heidegger calls, *distantiality*. In everyday Being-with-one-another, distantiality takes the form of *subservience* to Others. “The everyday possibilities of being of Dasein are at the disposal of the whims of others.” (p.122-123)

These Others aren’t definite individuals, nor are they a group, nor are they even the sum of all Others – Heidegger calls them, *the they* – and it represents a kind of group consciousness or public consensus that emerges when any group gathers. Succumbing to the *they* means that Dasein gives away control of his/her Being to them. We enjoy ourselves the way *they* enjoy themselves, we hold opinions that *they* hold, etc.

An immediate consequence of this adoption of the “*they*-self” is that each individual Dasein is anonymous. Heidegger gives the example of a newspaper, which can be read by anyone and explicitly doesn’t take into account any distinguishing features of the reader; all readers are the same.

The *they* represents the kind of Being of everydayness.

Heidegger identifies three ways of Being of the *they* and terms this “publicness”:

1. Distantiality – An awareness and comparing of Dasein to Others
2. Averageness – What the *they* is primarily concerned with, ensuring that no individual Dasein breaks the norm
3. Levelling down – This is the restriction of the possibilities of Being of Dasein imposed by its lostness in the *they*

Other characteristics of Being-among-one-another include:

1. Disburdening of one’s Being – This occurs as the *they* takes away Dasein’s responsibility for itself; Dasein no longer has to take responsibility for its own Being, it can blend in with *them*
2. Accommodation – This refers to the way the *they* enables Dasein to take things easily and make them easy

Curiously, Heidegger says that, “*They they is an existential and belongs as a primordial phenomenon to the positive constitution of Dasein*.” (p.125) And even more strongly, “*Authentic being a self* is not based on an exceptional state of the subject, detached from the they, *but is an existentiell modification of the they as an essential existential*.” (p.126)

These passages mean that being lost in the *they* is not an existentiell possibility of Dasein’s Being-with, but *the* existential grounding for Dasein’s Being. Heidegger is also clear that this *they-self* is an inauthentic mode of Being, meaning that Dasein is primordially, existentially inauthentic in its Being-with. Authentic Being-with, if it should be achieved, is the ontic modification of this more prior existential mode of Being. “As the they-self, Dasein is *dispersed* in the they and must first find itself.” (p.125)

One way to make sense of this is to remember that Heidegger stressed in Being-in-the-world (which regards innerworldly useful things) the referential totality of significance in which things-at-hand were freed to be discovered in their relevance, which basically meant that all things are always already encountered and caught up in a complex web of relations.

Dasein, appearing in a world populated by other beings whose Being is the same as mine, also finds itself always already caught up in a complex web of social roles, norms, and customs without which, it couldn’t be. These features of human society pay no respect to the individuals that make them up; an individual Dasein can be a teacher, but so can any other individual Dasein. Additionally, and by necessity, a teacher is defined in terms that make no reference to any individual Dasein. In our regular (everyday) functioning, we all ‘wear’ many of these identities and we wear them as if they were really who we are. Automatically (primordially), just by virtue of the fact that we are societal creatures and live in a world populated by other humans, our natural state of Being must be this inauthentic mode of Being-with, which we subsequently have to work to free ourselves from.

Chapter Five: Being-In

This section fleshes out what it means for Dasein to be in the world, which is fundamentally expressed in its disclosedness. This ability Dasein has to disclose rests in what Heidegger calls Dasein’s “there”. This is a reference to the word Dasein itself (*there-being*) and indicates the way Dasein discloses spatiality; ““Here” and “over there” are possible only in a “there,” that is, when there is a being which as the being of the “there” has disclosed spatiality.” (p.129)

There are two equiprimordially existential constituents to the there that characterise the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world:

1. Attunement (mood) – This is not ‘mood’ understood psychologically, but rather an ontological concept which is prior to all psychological ‘moods’. Attunement is essentially the familiarity we have with the world which, again, operates ‘before’ all cognition and willing. Unlike emotions, attunement isn’t an internal, psychic state; it is more like an “atmosphere” that Dasein is immersed in and which opens the world to him or her.
	1. Dasein is always already in a mood
	2. The “whence and whither” of Dasein’s mood is always obscure. “Mood assails” (p.133) It comes from Being-in-the-world itself as a mode of that Being.
	3. Heidegger calls this the *thrownness* of Dasein into its there; attunement is existentially surrendered to thrownness
	4. Attunement always brings Dasein before itself in a way more primordial than merely ‘knowing’ itself
	5. Mood discloses not from a seeking but from a fleeing (from thrownness)
	6. This disclosing in attunement colours Dasein’s whole perspective on its world
	7. We never master a mood by eliminating a mood, but always through a counter mood
	8. Mood discloses the there but also closes it off, e.g. bad moods, through which the surrounding world of heedfulness, circumspection, even Dasein itself are all obscured

Mood is always an enigma and this remains true even “when Dasein is “sure” of its “whither” in faith or thinks it knows about its whence in rational enlightenment” (p.132).

Heidegger summarises the essential ontological characteristics of attunement as follows:

* “*Attunement discloses Dasein in its thrownness and, initially and for the most part, in the mode of an evasive turning away*.” (p132-133) (Disclosing thrownness)
* “*Mood has always already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible directing oneself toward something*.” (p.133) (Disclosing Being-in-the-world)
* “*In attunement lies existentially a disclosive submission to world out of which things that matter to us can be encountered*.” (p.134) (Being affected or moved by things encountered heedfully is only possible because attunement has always already disclosed the world as something which can affect it)

*Fear as a Mode of Attunement*

Heidegger analyses fear as an example of attunement. He highlights three aspects:

1. What we are afraid of – always something encountered in the world
2. Fearing itself – frees the threatening thing in a way which lets us be concerned, i.e. our response
3. That about which we are afraid – our safety, i.e. Dasein. Only a being concerned in its Being about its Being can be afraid
4. Understanding – Heidegger makes clear that this understanding is a fundamental mode of the potentiality-of-Being of the there, not a kind of cognition which ‘explains’. Intuition and thought are both derived from understanding. The thing we are able to do in understanding is exist; it is the way we project ourselves onto one or other of our existentiell possibilities, not by ‘knowing’ them but by ‘doing’ them. Understanding for Heidegger is fundamentally and essentially practical.
	1. Understanding is a potentiality of Being that is disclosive
	2. Understanding is always attuned (therefore always already gone astray in thrownness, i.e. failed to recognise itself)
	3. Has the existential structure of *project* (it projects the Being of Dasein upon its for-the-sake-of-which)
	4. “As projecting, understanding is the mode of being of Dasein in which it *is* its possibilities as possibilities.” (p.141)
	5. Can be authentic (originating from its own self) or inauthentic
	6. Heidegger says understanding constitutes *sight* geared towards Being as such, and calls correctly understood self-knowledge (a complete grasping and understanding based in full disclosiveness), *transparency*, as opposed to merely gazing at the self
	7. Just staring at something before us is a failure to understand it
	8. Grounded in the as-structure

*Interpretation* is the development of possibilities projected in understanding. When something has been disclosed in understanding it has the structure of *something as something*. That means it is always already accessible so it’s “as what” can be delineated. This “as” structure constitutes interpretation and Heidegger calls this the hermeneutical situation.

Heidegger means here that we don’t need to analyse something at hand in the surrounding world – it is always already disclosed in understanding with an interpretation that automatically grasps things *as* they are.

However, interpretation does not impart significance to a thing originally objectively present. Rather what is “encountered in the world is always already in a relevance which is disclosed in the understanding of world, a relevance which is made explicit by interpretation.” (p.145)

Interpretation of something as something is grounded in the *fore-structure*:

* *Fore-having* – the appropriation (having) of Being in understanding (i.e. understanding the background *context* or totality of involvements in which any concrete interpretation takes place; e.g. a workshop)
* *Foresight* – approaches what has been taken in fore-having with a definite view (i.e. the unveiling of something specific towards which we set our sights within the fore-having; e.g. a hammer in the workshop)
* *Fore-conception* – the definite conceptualisation decided on in interpretation (the full understanding of the object grasped by interpretation; e.g. the hammer as a tool for hammering)

*Meaning* refers to the case when innerworldly beings are discovered with Dasein, that is, when they become intelligible. Meaning is the “formal, existential framework of the disclosedness belonging to understanding.” (p.147)

Meaning is an existential of Dasein which means that it is nothing to do with things at hand; “*only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless”* (p.147). All other beings are *unmeaningful* and “*only what is unmeaningful can be absurd*” (p.147).

*The Vicious Circle*

Heidegger spends a moment talking about the vicious circle of knowledge and interpretation. If interpretation is always predicated on an understanding that is *always already* thrown and immersed in the world (which attunement discloses), how can we ever have knowledge of the world, not already conditioned (tainted) by that very world?

The secret is to realise that this is not a vicious circle and look for a way out (this is impossible); rather we have to “get into it the right way.” (p.148) This circle isn’t actually a problem; rather it is an expression of the fundamental nature of Dasein; “Beings which, as being-in-the-world, are concerned about their being itself have an ontological structure of the circle.” (pp.148-149). The task of interpretation is not to ‘get out’ of the circle; but to embrace understanding (which only takes place *in* a world) and ensure that the fore-structure is not “given to it by chance ideas and popular conceptions” (p.148).

In talking about knowledge as demanded by science, Heidegger points out here that “Mathematics is not more exact than history, but only narrower with regard to the scope of the existential foundations relevant to it.” (p.148) The sciences can ignore more of their preconceptions than the arts because their concern is narrower.

*Statement*

The statement is based on understanding and is a derivative form of interpretation. Heidegger outlines the structure of statement as follows:

1. Statement means *pointing out*, that is “to let beings be seen from themselves.” (p.149)
2. Statement is based on *predication*. A predicate is stated about a subject, and in doing so it *determines* the subject
3. Statement means *communication*. It lets someone see what is being pointed out

In summary, “*Statement is a pointing out which communicates and defines*.” (p.151) The statement (being a derivative of interpretation) is also built on the threefold fore-structure.

1. Fore-having – something disclosed in general in the mode of determining based on a background practical understanding of the world
2. Foresight – in the sense that the predicate is “loosened” from the being itself to be made explicit
3. Fore-conception – The statement always operates within a definite (although restricted) set of concepts

Interpretation is a “primordial” act which discloses the world in a circumspect and heedful manner. Statement is a modification of circumspect interpretation because the being initially heedfully disclosed in fore-having as a useful thing becomes the “object” of a statement. “Something *at hand with which* we have to do or perform something, turns into something “about which” the statement that points it out is made.” (p.152) Fore-sight is now directed at something objectively present and *qualities* become accessible for the first time (useful things have no explicit qualities; their Being is given in a primordial unity all at once). The “as” no longer encompasses a totality of relevance and is cut off from the referential relations of significance that link it to the surrounding world in fore-conception. The “existential-*hermeneutical*” “as” of circumspect interpretation that understands (and is pregnant with possibility) becomes the *apophantical* “as” of the statement.

*Dasein and Discourse – Statement as communication (Language)*

Heidegger says that discourse is the existential-ontological foundation of language and is “*existentially equiprimordial with attunement and understanding.*” (p.155) He claims that discourse lies at the basis of interpretation and statement because it is the “articulation of intelligibility” (p.155) which seems to be something like *meaning*. It is “constitutive for the being of the there, that is, attunement and understanding.” (p.159)

Discourse is expressed in language. Heidegger says that discourse is existential language because the beings whose disclosedness it articulates have the kind of Being of Being-in-the-world. Discoursing is the “significant” structuring of the intelligibility of being-in-the-world” (p.156) and is always discourse about….

It is important that communication is never from the “inside” of one subject to the “inside” of another. Rather, “Dasein-with is essentially already manifest in attunement-with and understanding-with. Being-with is “explicitly” *shared* in discourse…” (p.157)

Heidegger outlines three essential possibilities of discourse:

1. Listening – an existential Being-open as Being-with for another
2. *Hearkening* – this is phenomenally primordial to hearing. Heidegger points out that we never “hear” sounds (various notes and tones) first before identifying them. Instead, they come to us ‘fully formed’ as it were. He adds that this is a phenomenal proof that “Dasein, as being-in-the-world, always maintains itself *together with* innerworldly things at hand and initially not at all with “sensations” whose chaos would first have to be formed…” (p.158)
3. Keeping silent – this is how we let something be understood

Discourse is not about making vocal utterances, but Being in the “mode of discovering world and Dasein itself.” (p.159) Heidegger asserts that the Greeks initially understood *logos* as a phenomenal discourse, as opposed to language. However, after the philosophical predilection for rational thought took hold, grammar (the structures and forms of discourse) searched for its foundations in the “logic” of discourse as statement, that is, a ‘language’ that is ontologically concerned with what is objectively present.

He wants to “free” grammar from logic but is of the opinion that this can’t be done attempting to improve and supplement the tradition; it can only be achieved by abandoning it altogether in favour of his existential-ontological conception of Being.

*Everyday Being of the There*

Here Heidegger seeks to determine the existential characteristics of the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world (the there) in the mode of Being of the they. He observes that understanding, as a potentiality-for-Being of Dasein leads us to consider “which possibilities of its being Dasein, as the they, has disclosed and appropriated to itself.” (p.161) He breaks down the everyday Being of the they into three categories which have parallels with his earlier discussion of the there; discourse, sight, and interpretation.

1. Idle talk – This constitutes the “mode of being of the understanding and interpretation of everyday Dasein” (p.162) and is essentially only an approximate and superficial understanding of what is spoken about. Heidegger describes this as listening to what is spoken about, but failing to understand at all the *beings* talked about.

Idle talk is constituted by *gossip* and *passing the word along* as opposed to discourse. It can also be passed along in writing, when it becomes *scribbling*. Heidegger notes that idle talk is not necessarily deceiving, just a groundless passing along.

Another feature distinguishing idle talk from discourse is that the latter is a way of keeping Being-in-the-world open, a way of discovering Being-in-the-world, but the former is a closing off since it never goes back to the foundation of what is being talked about (Being itself).

1. Curiosity – In the disclosedness of Being-in, sight became possible for Dasein and was linked with understanding. Heidegger calls the equivalent of sight as it relates to everydayness, *seeing*, and defines it as a way of Being that “takes care to see not in order to understand what it sees… but *only* in order to see.” (p.166) Curiosity seeks novelty rather than truth and therefore is characterised by a *not-staying* with what is nearest. *Distraction* is another element central to curiosity. Heidegger gives one final characteristic, that of *never dwelling anywhere*, instead Dasein, in this mode, is everywhere and nowhere.
2. Ambiguity – The above two aspects of everydayness comprise the third, ambiguity. Being-in-the-they means that everything is accessible to everybody and everyone can say everything about what is encountered. It therefore becomes impossible to disclose anything in genuine understanding. Heidegger calls this ambiguity.

Two things need to be mentioned at this point. First, Heidegger emphasises that these everyday modes of Being are not disparaging in any sense. They are all “positive” phenomena, that is, valid possibilities for the Being of Dasein, as opposed to constituting a “nonbeing” of Dasein or the case where Dasein has somehow lost it’s Being and is “*no-longer-*Being-in-the-world. Second, despite the fact that they reflect positive potentialities of Being, they are inauthentic ways of Being and as such, are only possible for a being “whose disclosedness is constituted by attuned and understanding discourse” (p.164).

*Falling Prey and Thrownness*

 The three existential determinations depicted above together reveal the Being of everydayness which Heidegger calls, the *entanglement* of Dasein. This term describes Dasein’s absorption in the world in the way of being lost in the they. In this, “Dasein has initially always already fallen away from itself and fallen prey to the “world.”” (p.169) *Falling prey*, means Dasein’s absorption in the world as guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.

Despite the fact that this everyday kind of Being is inauthentic and is only possible for a being “whose disclosedness is constituted by attuned and understanding discourse” (p.164) we must not fall into the mistake of thinking that the falling prey of Dasein is a “fall” from a more primordial and more authentic condition. Authenticity is not Dasein’s primordial condition, rather the grounding of its Being in attunement and understanding is. Dasein can then relate to this primordial grounding in either an authentic or inauthentic manner.

Heidegger goes on to identify several characteristics of falling prey:

1. Falling prey is a constant temptation for Dasein which means that “Being-in-the-world is in itself *tempting*.” (p.170)
2. Falling prey is *tranquillizing* because it reassures Dasein that “one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine “life”” (p.171).
3. Falling prey is *alienating* because “its ownmost potentiality for being-in-the-world is concealed.” (p.171)

Heidegger calls the “movement” of falling prey, the *plunge*, because Dasein “plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nothingness of inauthentic everydayness.” (p.171-172) This plunge is concealed from it however by the way it is publicly interpreted as “getting ahead” and “living concretely”. Because this plunge is a constant tearing away from authenticity, Heidegger says the plunge is characterised by *turbulence*.

In closing this section, Heidegger reminds us that falling prey is not a “night view” of Dasein. Such a view would amount to an ontic property, whereas falling prey is an “*essential*, ontological structure of Dasein itself.” (p.172)

Chapter Six: Care as the Being of Dasein

Heidegger has now outlined a structural whole to the Being of Dasein; “*The average everydayness of Dasein* can thus be determined as *entangled-disclosed, thrown-projecting being-in-the-world, which is concerned with its ownmost potentiality in its being together with the “world” and in being-with others.*” (p.175-176) He now wants to grasp this structural whole in its totality and is searching for a way to do so.

*Anxiety as an Eminent Disclosedness of Dasein*

The entangled absorption of Dasein’s mode of Being in the they revealed itself as a flight of Dasein from itself as an authentic potentiality for being itself. This “turning away” serves to close off this authentic potentiality but, as with all privations, turning away from indicates precisely that which has been turned away from. In order to flee from itself, Dasein must already have disclosed itself, “there”. As Heidegger says, “this existentielly-ontic turning away makes it phenomenally possible to grasp existentially and ontologically what the flight is from.” (p.179)

In order to grasp this Being Dasein is fleeing from, Heidegger wants to isolate a specific kind of attunement (mood) associated with falling prey. He notes that this turning away is not based on a fear of innerworldly beings; rather turning away precisely *turns towards* innerworldly beings, becoming absorbed in them. He concludes that the “*turning away of falling prey is rather based on anxiety*” (p.180)

The thing about anxiety (or dread) is that it is different from fear in that it lacks a specific object (it is not about innerworldly beings). This means not only that what anxiety is about doesn’t have any relevance or significance, it means that the totality of relevance and the referential totality of significance Dasein discovered in the world is completely without importance. Everything Dasein has previously understood turns out to be empty and without meaning.

At this point, we realise that, “*That about which one has anxiety is being-in-the-world as such*” (p.180); Dasein is anxious about the possibility of things at hand in general. Of course, the world “ontologically belongs essentially to the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world… [which means] *that about which anxiety is anxious is being-in-the-world itself*.” (p.181)

And here is what we were looking for. Being anxious is about, and discloses, the world, as world.

Anxiety is not only anxiety about… it is also anxiety for…

However, that for which Dasein is anxious cannot be a definite kind of possibility of Dasein since anxiety has already revealed the insignificance and irrelevance of things at hand in general. In doing so, anxiety strips away the possibility of Dasein’s understanding itself in the mode of falling prey and throws Dasein back upon its authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. “Anxiety individuates Dasein to its ownmost being-in-the-world which, as understanding, projects itself essentially upon possibilities.” (p.182) Anxiety reveals Dasein’s ultimate being free in the face of itself. Heidegger calls this individualising nature of anxiety, existential *solipsism*, which obviously has nothing to do with the isolation of an individual subject-thing.

The long and short of all this is that what Dasein is anxious for is the same as what it is anxious about: Being-in-the-world. Dasein is anxious about… thrown Being-in-the-world and anxious for… its potentiality for Being-in-the-world.

Earlier, Heidegger defined Being-in as a “dwelling with…” or “being familiar with…” However, we then saw that Being-in is primordially an entangled, tranquillised dwelling-with in the mode of everyday publicness of the they. This dwelling with… disclosed Being-in as a “being-at-home”. Anxiety, however, drags Dasein out of this absorption in the world and discloses Being-in in the existential mode of *not-being-at-home*. Heidegger calls this *uncanniness*.

We also saw how Heidegger earlier proclaimed that Dasein’s inauthentic “dwelling-with…” in everydayness was its primordial existential mode of Being. Authenticity was an existentiell modification of this.

This everyday analysis of anxiety, however, reveals phenomenally that “familiar” Being-in-the-world is actually a mode of the uncanniness of Dasein, not the other way around. “*Not-being-at-home must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon*.” (p.183) Although, I think it would probably be wrong to assert that uncanniness itself is authentic. Rather, uncanniness is prior to both authenticity *and* inauthenticity; from this anxiety-revealed uncanniness, Dasein can then choose (in complete freedom) which possibility of its Being to project itself upon.

*The Being of Dasein as Care*

Anxiety has revealed three fundamental characteristics in the Being of Dasein:

1. Existentiality – Dasein is a being which is concerned in its Being about that Being. The “is concerned about” has been shown, through understanding, to be a self-projecting of Dasein into its possibilities. Ontologically, this potentiality-for-Being means that Dasein is “always already *ahead* of itself in its being.” (p.185)
2. Facticity – Being-in-the-world has been shown to have the constitution of thrownness meaning that Dasein is always already in the world and subsumed in a referential totality of significance anchored in a for-the-sake-of-which. In short, “existing is always factical.” (p.186)
3. Falling prey – As soon as Dasein finds itself as a thrown potentiality-for-Being it is always already absorbed in the world in entanglement.

This gives us the “formal existential totality of the ontological structural whole of Dasein… [as] being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered).” (p.186) Heidegger calls this totality *care*.

Care is the ultimate “primordial structural totality… [and] lies “before” every factical “attitude” and “position” of Dasein, that is, it is always already *in* them as an existential *a priori*.” (p.187)

*Reality*

Heidegger claims that reality is not merely one kind of being amongst other kinds of beings but is ontologically foundational in its own right, along with Dasein, world, and handiness.

An analysis of reality has heretofore been confounded with the problem of the external world because such an analysis is only possible on the basis of access to the real. This access has traditionally been considered to be granted through intuitive cognition. The problem is that cognition is a *founded* mode of the Being of Dasein, which means that the real is only accessible based on Being-in-the-world (care (Being ahead of itself – already Being in a world – as Being together with innerworldly beings)).

For Heidegger, the problem of the external world is a non-starter; it makes no sense to even ask the question because Dasein *is* Being-in-the-world, i.e. the world is “essentially disclosed *with the being* of Dasein” (p.195); and again, “Dasein defies such proofs, because it always already *is* in its being what the later proofs first deem necessary to demonstrate for it.” (p.197) Kant’s ‘scandal of philosophy and human reason in general’ “does not consist in the fact that this proof is still lacking up to now, but *in the fact that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again*.” (p.197) The search for a proof of reality will always fail because it presupposes an inadequate ontological starting point; the world-less subject.

So Heidegger asks if reality should then be taken on faith but rejects this because it is still seeking to answer a question that fundamentally makes no sense.

He also considers a third resolution; that the subject, as a subject, *must* presuppose the external world (perhaps by nature of its being a subject) but also rejects this, this time based on the fact that it is still starting with an ontologically inadequate, isolated, *worldless* subject.

Knowledge, doubt, and faith are behaviours already founded in Being-in-the-world; we can’t use them to determine Being-in-the-world because Being-in-the-world is “earlier” than any behaviour Dasein can engage in. And earlier than any such behaviour “is the “*a priori*” of its constitution of being in the mode of being of care.” (p.198)

He then concludes this section by pointing out that his reasoning agrees with *realism* in the understanding that the external world is objectively present in some way but disagrees with it in that *realism* believes this world needs proof, thinks it is capable of finding proof, and completely lacks an ontological comprehension of reality.

Heidegger finds favour with *idealism*, if it emphasises the fact that being and reality are only in consciousness because it “expresses the understanding that being cannot be explained by beings… but is always already the “transcendental” for every being” (pp.199-200). To the extent however, that idealism clings to a subject or consciousness undetermined in its Being, then it is no better than realism.

Heidegger then traces out reality’s ‘lineage’ back to care as follows:

Reality refers to the Being of innerworldly beings objectively present 🡪 to understand this mode of Being we need to understand innerworldliness 🡪 innerworldliness is based on the phenomenon of world 🡪 world belongs to the fundamental constitution of Dasein as Being-in-the-world 🡪 Being-in-the-world is ontologically connected to the structural totality of Dasein we called care.

So, reality is ontologically grounded in the Being of Dasein, but this cannot mean that without Dasein there are no objectively present beings. Instead, “only as long as Dasein *is*… “is there” being… If Dasein does not exist then innerworldly beings, too, can neither be discovered, nor can they lie in concealment. *Then* it can neither be said that beings are, nor that they are not.” (pp. 203-204) Such matters are then neither comprehensible nor incomprehensible.” (pp. 203-204) And again, “being [not beings] is dependent upon the understanding of being; that is, reality [not the real] is dependent upon care.” (p.204)

Heidegger adds as a final point in this section that beings having the kind of Being of Dasein cannot be comprehended in terms of reality and substance because the “*substance of human being is existence*.” (p.204)

*Truth*

Heidegger now turns to the concept of truth. He first identifies the traditional concept of truth as comprising two features:

1. The “locus” of truth is the proposition (or judgement)
2. The essence of truth lies in the “agreement” of the judgement with its object.

Heidegger first looks at this notion of “agreement”. He notes that it is a relation of something to something but then observes that this line of enquiry quickly deteriorates into a mire from which we can’t extract anything useful. How is the act of judging related to the content of the judgement? How is the content (ideal in nature) then related to the actual being (the object)? Knowing and judging seem to be separated into two kinds of Being that cannot be joined.

In sidestepping this ontological murkiness, Heidegger turns to a real-life example for clarification in which someone with his back to the wall makes the true statement, “The picture on the wall is hanging crookedly.” First, Heidegger asserts that the speaker is related only to the real thing (the picture) and not a representation of it in his mind, thus eliminating the intermediary between an ‘inner’ subject and an ‘outer’ object.

Second, he returns to a discussion of statement (which we remember is a modification of circumspect interpretation which discloses in fore-having (something “about which” as opposed to “at hand”), fore-sight (as something objectively present with qualities,) and fore-conception (the apophantical “as” of the statement as opposed to the existential-hermeneutical “as” of circumspection)), in particular, that what the statement demonstrates is nothing else “than *that* this being *is* the very being that was meant in the statement” (p.209).

The take-home point from all of this is that statement is a “Being-uncovering” (p261, MacQuarrie & Robinson trans.) which uncovers the being towards which it is. “What is to be demonstrated is not an agreement of knowing with its object, still less of the psychical with the physical; but neither is it an agreement between ‘contents of consciousness’ among themselves. What is to be demonstrated is solely the Being-uncovered of the entity itself… This uncoveredness is confirmed when that which is put forward in the assertion [‘statement’ in Stambaugh] (namely the entity itself) shows itself *as that very same thing*.” (p.261 MacQuarrie & Robinson trans.)

Truth therefore, has nothing to do with any kind of agreement between knowing and object; rather, “Being-true as Being-uncovering, is in turn ontologically possible only on the basis of Being-in-the-world.” (p.261 MacQuarrie & Robinson trans.)

This may sound like a trivial point; there can be no truth without a being to adjudge what is true (Dasein) but Heidegger is saying something more than this. He is saying there can be no truth without a prior articulation of reality, which we derive from Being-in-the-world, which Dasein *is*. The truth of the statement, “The picture on the wall is hanging crookedly” cannot even be formulated meaningfully unless the entire conceptual framework that the statement addresses is already in place. We need to understand ‘picture’, ‘wall’, what it means for something ‘to hang’, etc. Without Dasein the source of this conceptual framework would be absent and so statements of truth or untruth would be impossible.

*The Primordial Phenomenon of Truth*

Being-true as Being-uncovering is a way of Being of Dasein; however what makes this uncovering possible must be ‘true’ in an even more primordial sense.

Uncovering is a way of Being for Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Care (either in circumspection or just looking) uncovers beings. They become that which has been uncovered and are ‘true’ in a secondary sense. What is primarily true, as uncovering (Being-uncovering), is Dasein itself, whereas secondary truth means Being-uncovered (uncoveredness).

When Heidegger uses the term ‘uncovering’, what he means is the “opening up” of the logical space created by the conceptual framework (discussed above re: the picture) in which particular statements can have meaning. Uncovering reveals Being-in-the-world in all its articulated glory which allows beings to be disclosed and apprehended as either like the statement or unlike the statement.

Heidegger now wants to flesh out the relation between uncoveredness and Dasein. He does this by pointing out that the uncoveredness of innerworldly beings is grounded in the disclosedness of the world and the disclosedness of the world is the basic character of Dasein in which it is it’s there. This disclosedness is constituted by attunement, understanding, and discourse; which of course, is all encapsulated by the structural unity of care as being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered). The disclosedness of Dasein is therefore the most primordial phenomenon of truth.

But since Dasein *is* its disclosedness and, as disclosed it discloses and uncovers, then “*Dasein is “in the truth”*” (p.212). This obviously doesn’t mean that Dasein knows everything ontically, but that truth (as Being-uncovering and including everything that comes with articulated, circumspect Being-in-care) belongs to Dasein’s existential constitution and makes possible ‘truth’ (as Being-uncovered, which is articulated through statement and confirmed or denied by the innerworldly being itself).

Heidegger attributes four considerations to this expression, “Dasein is in the truth”:

1. Disclosedness in general
2. Thrownness – disclosedness is essentially factical
3. Project – an authentic and disclosive Being toward its own potentiality-of-Being. Heidegger calls this most authentic disclosedness the *truth of existence*.
4. Falling prey – an inauthentic, although primordial, mode of disclosedness in which beings are uncovered but at the same time distorted, in the mode of semblance. “*Because it essentially falls prey to the world, Dasein is in “untruth” in accordance with its constitution of being.*” (p.213)

That last sentence reveals something interesting, “The full existential and ontological meaning of the statement, “Dasein is in the truth,” also says equiprimordially that “Dasein is in untruth.”” (p.213) This is only possible because truth is not to be thought of as an “agreement” between knowing and object, but as a fundamental way of Being of Dasein, specifically a Being-uncovering.

Heidegger summarises this section by saying:

1. Truth in the most primordial sense is the disclosedness of Dasein, to which belongs the discoveredness [uncoveredness] of innerworldly beings.
2. Dasein is equiprimordially in truth and untruth.

Finally, Heidegger wants to draw up the ontological derivation of the traditional concept of truth. Although he is clear that “the roots of the truth of statement reach back to the disclosedness of understanding” (p.214) and have nothing to do with agreement; since the traditional concept of truth relies on agreement, he must find his way there from the existential phenomenon he has outlined.

He claims that we have treated statement, not as based on interpretation, understanding, and ultimately the disclosedness of Dasein, but as an innerworldly thing at hand. This innerworldly statement can now be seen as having an uncovering relation to something at hand or objectively present. This relation itself is thus something objectively present and by virtue of the fact that the uncoveredness in the statement is always an uncoveredness of… the relation becomes an agreement between something objectively present (the statement) *to* another thing objectively present (the being spoken about).

To wind up, he says that the statement is a kind of Being of Dasein which can either uncover *or* cover up and this is the essence of Being-true (as Being-uncovering or truth).

He also returns to the first point highlighted in the outline of the traditional view of truth by saying that the “statement is not the primary “locus” of truth, but the *other way around*… the most primordial “truth” is the “locus” of the statement and this primordial truth is the ontological condition of the possibility that statements can be true or false (discovering or covering over).” (p.217)

*The Kind of Being of Truth*

Since truth is disclosedness, uncovering, and uncoveredness, and since these are all ways of Being of Dasein, it follows that without Dasein there can be no truth. Heidegger asserts that all truth is therefore relative to Dasein but rejects the notion that truth is therefore subjective, if by relative one means “left to the arbitrariness of the subject” (p.218) because by its very nature, uncovering means revealing the being as it is in itself (or bringing uncovering Dasein before beings themselves, as Heidegger says).

One final quote from Heidegger to sum up this chapter, ““There is” being – not beings – only insofar as truth is. And truth *is* only insofar as, and as long as, Dasein is.” (p.220)

Division Two: Dasein and Temporality

Heidegger opens this section by revisiting the hermeneutical situation (interpretation based on the fore-structure) that formed the basis of the existential analysis thus far. In particular, he points out that it is still incomplete.

*Fore-sight* has defined existence as a potentiality-of-Being which is always *mine* and is always free for authenticity or inauthenticity. Thus far we have only examined the inauthentic mode of Being in the they. We must investigate authentic potentiality-of-Being.

*Fore-having* must bring the *whole* of Dasein, from beginning to end, into view but so far, we have only investigated “everydayness” which is the Being between birth and death. Further, if Dasein is always a potentiality-of-Being then by definition there is always something outstanding from our understanding. To this end we must include death in our interpretation of fore-having.

Our final *fore-conception* of Dasein will then include Dasein’s “*authentic potentiality-for-being-whole*” (p.224) and have achieved phenomenal ‘primordialness’.

Finally, we also have to go back and revisit each of the ontological structures outlined and “free” them with regard to their temporal meaning. This is Heidegger’s final card.

Chapter One: Being-a-Whole of Dasein and Being-toward-Death

The structural factor of care, Being-ahead-of-itself, means that there is always something *outstanding* in Dasein; “A *constant unfinished quality* thus lies in the essence of the basic constitution of Dasein.” (p.227) This is a serious problem with regard to Heidegger’s goal of reaching an understanding of the *whole* of Dasein; suggesting that this existential project may be unfulfillable in its essence.

It suggests that Dasein only reaches its wholeness in death, when all potentialities-for-Being are extinguished. The problem is that at this time it simultaneously loses the being of the there, it transitions to no-longer-Dasein, meaning that the possibility of experiencing this transition is forever denied to it.

As a way of overcoming and probing this limitation, Heidegger begins a new inquiry:

* The possibility of experiencing the death of others – In investigating this he first considers that when an other dies, they are still a being in the sense of having objective presence. Heidegger rejects this as missing the phenomenal content of the being. We encounter the deceased, not as a *lifeless* thing, but as “something *unliving* which has lost its life.” (p.229) Not only this but the ““deceased,” as distinct from the dead body, has been torn away from “those remaining behind” and is the object of “being taken care of” in funeral rites, burial, and the cult of graves.” (p229) They continue to linger together with the deceased in mourning and commemorating, “in a mode of concern which honors him.” (p.230) So, not only is the relation to the dead not one to something objectively present, it also isn’t a being together with something at hand. This leads Heidegger to conclude that “in such being-with with the dead, the real having-come-to-an-end of the deceased is precisely *not* experienced… we are at best always just “near by”” (p.230).
* Although this fails to give us what we were looking for, it does reveal two things fundamental about death; first, that it cannot be experienced through another. “*No one can take the other’s dying away from him*.” (p.231) This is opposite to the everyday mode of Being in which we saw that ““One *is*” what one does… [and] representability is not only possible in general, but is even constitutive for being-with-one-another.” (p.231) And second, that the going-out-of-the-world of Dasein is fundamentally *not* like the going-out-of-the-world of something merely living.
* Heidegger turns to this notion of the “lack of wholeness” of Dasein which finds its end in death and investigates this as something *outstanding*, as in a debt owed. The problem here is that to be outstanding means that “what belongs together is not yet together” (p.233) and this kind of Being is the kind of Being of something-at-hand. In carrying on from here, Heidegger points out that Dasein is not the kind of being that *is* only together when its not-yet has been filled out; rather “Dasein always already exists in such a way that its not-yet *belongs* to it.” (p.234)
* This leads him to consider the kind of outstanding that pertains to the moon when it is not full. This not-yet-together doesn’t signify a not-yet-*being*-together and may therefore be more appropriate. The problem with this not-yet is that it pertains only to the way we *grasp* it perceptually. Dasein’s not-yet is not yet “real” at all; the problem is “the possible *being* or *nonbeing* of this not-yet. Dasein, as itself, has to *become*, that is, *be*, what it is not yet.” (p.234)
* Ripening fruit turns out to be more appropriate to Dasein. In ripening, there is nothing that has to be, or even *could* be, added to or taken away from the fruit to make it ripe. The unripe fruit “*is* the unripeness. The not-yet is already included in its own being… Correspondingly, Dasein, too, *is always already its not-yet* as long as it is… [the “unwholeness” in Dasein is] a not-yet that every Dasein, as the being that it is, has to be.” (p.235) We are getting closer to our goal but there is still something irrelevant in the analogy. “With ripeness, the fruit *fulfils* itself” (p.235) but Dasein’s death does not necessarily mean fulfilment; ‘Even “unfulfilled” Dasein ends.” (p.235)
* Next, Heidegger asks how death is to be grasped as the *ending* of Dasein. To this end, he interrogates what *stopping* means; (1) The rain stops, meaning it is no longer objectively present. (2) In contrast, a road stops which means it has become fully objectively present. (3) A painting ‘ends’ when it is *finished*; i.e. the last stroke has been painted. However, none of these appropriately characterise the end of Dasein.

The conclusion Heidegger draws is that “just as Dasein constantly already *is* its not-yet as long as it is, it also always already *is* its end… [It] does not signify a being-at-an-end of Dasein, but rather a *being toward the end* of this being.” (p.236) But he is careful to point out that we still haven’t reached a positive clarification of this Being. Thus far we have only expressed it negatively as the not-yet Dasein always *is* and which resists interpretation as something outstanding.

*The Existential and Ontological Structure of Death*

Some opening definitions. *Perishing* is the ending of what is merely alive (not Dasein, which *exists*). An inauthentic death for Dasein is called its *demise*. *Dying* is the way of Being in which Dasein is toward its death.

Now, the previous discussion has shown that we can’t grasp death as an existentiell possibility but neither can we grasp our relation to our end apart from our relation to our existentiell possibilities. As such, death must be graspable and manifest, indirectly, in our relation to all of our possibilities. Since death is a fundamental aspect of our Being, it is discernible as a pervasive element and grounded in our fundamental structure of Being; care. Ergo, it must show itself in the fundamental characteristics of the Being of Dasein, namely; Being-ahead-of-itself (existence), Already-Being-in (facticity), and Being-together-with (falling prey). Death is:

* One’s *ownmost* potentiality of Being (since “Dasein is concerned about its being-in-the-world absolutely. Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there” (p.241)) and is characterised by imminence.
* *Non-relational*. Being imminent to itself, “all relations to other Dasein are dissolved in it [death]” (p.241).
* *Insuperable*. Unavoidable by Dasein.
* Also revealed in the attunement of *anxiety*, since Dasein’s death is not created by itself, it finds itself *thrown* into this possibility. Recalling what we said earlier, that anxiety is anxious about Being-in-the-world, reveals how appropriate this attunement is to death since death is also about Being-in-the-world. Anxiety finally reveals itself as the “disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists as thrown being-*toward*-its-end.” (p.241)

*Being-toward-Death and the Everydayness of Dasein*

Since Dasein primordially exists in the mode of everydayness we need to investigate how Dasein is related to its death as constituted in the public interpretedness of the they. The publicness of everyday Being-with-one-another:

1. Increases the “*temptation* of covering over for itself its ownmost being-toward-death.” (p.243) Everyday Dasein ‘knows’ death as a “case of death”; a familiar but inconspicuous event. Idle talk carries the message that “one also dies at the end, but for now one is not affected… “Dying” is levelled down to an event which does concern Dasein, but which belongs to no one in particular.” (p.243)
2. *Tranquillises* one about death. We comfort someone who is dying by assuring them that they will get better and return to the “tranquillised everydayness of his world taken care of.” (p.243) This tranquillisation is just as much for the comforters as it is for those comforted.
3. *Estranges* Dasein from death in governing the way *one* is supposed to behave toward death in general. We ought not think about death and if we do it is considered “a sign of insecurity on the part of Dasein and a gloomy flight from the world. *The they does not permit the courage to have anxiety about death*.” (p.244) Rather, one should cultivate an “indifferent calm” towards death.

These three characteristics characterise the kind of Being of *falling prey*. “Entangled, everyday being-toward-death is a constant *flight from death*. Being *toward* the end has the mode of *evading that end*” (p.244)

The long and the short of it is that Dasein is always concerned with its ownmost, non-relational, and insuperable potentiality-of-Being, even in the mode of average everydayness when it manifests as a mode of untroubled indifference that covers over this possibility.

Despite this, the they is *certain* of death but this certainty must be false since it is, in its essence, a covering over of death. The way the they claims certainty about death is as an empirical fact, but the fact that “*demise, as an event that occurs, is “only” empirically certain, in no way decides about the certainty of death*… remaining within the empirical certainty which we characterized, Dasein cannot become certain at all of death as it “is”… The entangled everydayness of Dasein knows about the certainty of death, and yet avoids *being*-certain.” (p.247).

This is possible because “empirical” certainty is not “unconditional” certainty. The they shows this by saying that “death certainly comes, but not right away. With this “but…,” the they denies that death is certain… Death is postponed to “sometime later”” (p.247). This covers over a fundamental truth about death, “*that it is possible in every moment*.” (p.247) Everyday taking care of things covers over this indefiniteness, thereby covering over certainty.

This gives us our full “existential and ontological concept of death… as follows: *as the end of Dasein, death is the ownmost, nonrelational, certain, and, as such, indefinite and insuperable possibility of Dasein.* As the end of Dasein, *death is* in the being of this being *toward* its end.” (p.248) This formulation reveals that death is not something Dasein ‘arrives’ at, it is rather, “As thrown being-in-the-world, Dasein is always already delivered over to its death. Being toward its death, it dies factically and constantly as long as it has not reached its demise.” (p.248)

We have seen that everyday, entangled evasion of death is an inauthentic Being toward it. Can Dasein *authentically understand* its death?

*Existential Project of an Authentic Being-Toward-Death*

Heidegger begins by characterising Being-toward-death as a *Being toward a possibility*. “Being out for something possible and taking care of it has the tendency of *annihilating* the *possibility* of the possible by making it available.” (p.250) However, Being-toward-death is not some possible thing at hand or some possible objectively present thing so is not a possibility that has the kind of Being of being actualised.

Being-toward-death is also not meant to be a dwelling near the end as in brooding over death. This is an attempt to exert some control over death but “death is supposed to show as little as possible of its possibility… it must be understood *as possibility*, cultivated *as possibility*, and *endured as possibility* in our relation to it.” (p.250)

Now, Dasein relates to something possible in its possibility, by *expecting* it. However, expecting has the character of waiting for the actualisation, tending toward the real. This cannot be what constitutes Being-toward-death. Heidegger therefore chooses to formulate this Being toward possibility as *anticipation of this possibility*. “As possibility, death gives Dasein nothing to “be actualised” and nothing which it itself could *be* as something real. It is the possibility of the impossibility of every mode of behaviour toward…, of every way of existing.” (p.251) “Anticipation shows itself as the possibility of understanding one’s *ownmost* and extreme potentiality-of-being, that is, as the possibility of *authentic existence*.” (p.252)

Heidegger now moves to set forth the concrete structure of anticipation of death under the previously discussed ontological structure of death:

* Death is the *ownmost* possibility of Dasein. Anticipation tears itself away from the they.
* Death is *nonrelational*. Anticipation individualises Dasein to itself.
* Death is *insuperable*. Anticipation frees itself for the impossibility of evading death.
* Death is *certain*. Anticipation allows the possibility of death to become possible (through disclosedness which is the essence of truth).
* Death is *indefinite*. Anticipation opens Dasein to the constant threat of death through understanding which is attuned in *anxiety*. “In anxiety, Dasein finds itself *faced* with the nothingness of the possible impossibility of its existence.” (p.254)

By way of summary, Heidegger says, “*anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility to be itself, primarily unsupported by concern that takes care, but to be itself in passionate, anxious* ***freedom toward death****, which is free of the illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself.*” (p.255)

Chapter Two: The Attestation of Dasein of an Authentic Potentiality-of-Being and Resoluteness

Given that Dasein is always already lost in the inauthentic public interpretedness of the they, how can it ever realise its authentic potentiality for Being? Heidegger answers this by invoking *conscience*. Conscience discloses to Dasein its potential for authentic Being-a-self. Heidegger’s ‘conscience’ has only very little to do with the ontic (“vulgar”) understanding of conscience as some kind of exhortation to act ‘rightly’ as conceived in moral terms.

Heidegger describes conscience as a call (and therefore a mode of discourse), within which “lies the factor of a jolt of an abrupt arousal. The call calls from afar to afar. It reaches one who wants to be brought back.” (p.261)

*The Character of Conscience as the Call of Care*

There are three questions about the call of conscience Heidegger first asks:

1. What is summoned? Dasein itself. Specifically, “Dasein in this always-already-understanding-itself in everyday, average taking care of things” (p.262), i.e. the they-self of Dasein.
2. To what is one summoned? To one’s *own-self*. Out of the *they-self*, only the *self* is summoned meaning that the *they* collapses, “in *passing over* the they, the call pushed it (adamant as it is about public recognition) into insignificance.” (p.263) The self is summoned to its ownmost potentiality-of-Being.
3. What is the content of the call? Nothing. “The call does not say anything, does not give any information about events of the world, has nothing to tell… *Conscience speaks solely and constantly in the mode of silence.*” (p.263) It has no content because if it did, then it would merely become absorbed into the *idle talk* of the they; “…it does not call him into the public idle chatter of the they, but *calls* him *back* from that *to the reticence of his existent potentiality-of-being*” (p.266)

Heidegger then discusses *who* the caller is and the relation between the one summoning and the one being summoned.

The call is something that is not consciously prepared or planned by ourselves, yet it doesn’t come from someone else. Essentially, the call of conscience comes *from* Dasein and is called *to* Dasein, but this doesn’t make sense. This is the situation:

*That* it factically is might be concealed with regard to its *why*, but the “*that-it-is*” has *itself* been disclosed to Dasein. The thrownness of this being belongs to the disclosedness of the “there,” and reveals itself constantly in each and every attunement. Attunement brings Dasein, more or less explicitly and authentically, before its “that it is, and as the being that it is, has to be as a potentiality-of-being.” But for the most part, mood *closes off* thrownness… Uncanniness reveals itself authentically in the fundamental attunement of anxiety, and, as the most elemental disclosedness of thrown Dasein, it confronts being-in-the-world with the nothingness of the world about which it is anxious in the anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-of-being. *What if Dasein, finding itself in the ground of its uncanniness, were the caller of the call of conscience?*” (pp.265-266)

So, the call of conscience can come from Dasein because it is not like a ‘call’ as made by a human being. The call of conscience contains no information and has no words; rather it manifests (“reveals itself”) in mood (“attunement”), but not just any mood because mood typically closes Dasein off to itself in its everyday mode of Being in the they. Instead the call of conscience reveals itself through the mood of *anxiety*, which is grounded in the essential mode of *uncanniness* which, in turn, discloses Being-in-the-world as a primordial *unfamiliarity*, a sense of *not*-Being-at-home (this is the brute fact of Dasein’s “thrownness” or its “that-it-is” without any corresponding explanation of why-it-is). The call of conscience therefore arises from uncanny Being-in-the-world and through anxiety. The caller is “definable by *nothing* “worldly.” It is Dasein in its uncanniness, primordially thrown being-in-the-world, as not-at-home, the naked “that” in the nothingness of the world.” (p.266) An existential understanding of conscience yields the simple statement, “uncanniness pursues Dasein and threatens its self-forgetful lostness.” (p.267)

As Dasein is caught up in the they, conscience is naturally interpreted as an “*alien* voice”; a voice coming from somewhere else and perhaps even some*one* else, but this is incorrect.

Heidegger concludes this whole section by identifying conscience as the call of care through the tripartite division of care we outlined earlier:

* The caller is Dasein anxious in its throwness (its already-Being-in…) about its potentiality-of-Being
* The one summoned is also Dasein, called out of falling prey to the they (already-Being-together-with-the-world-taken-care-of) and called forth to its ownmost potentiality-of-Being (in its already-ahead-of-itself…)

*Guilt and the Summons*

Heidegger begins this section pointing out that the call of conscious addresses Dasein as “guilty” but he now needs to determine the existential concept of Being-guilty. He proceeds to outline the various ways in which we use the word “guilty.” There are two:

* “Being-guilty” can mean “having debts”. This kind of being is related to things that can be taken care of.
* “Being-guilty” can mean “being responsible for”. In this sense, one is the cause or author of something.

Heidegger determines that “having debts with…” and “being responsible for…” can go together and give us a kind of behaviour he calls, “making oneself responsible”, which means “by having the responsibility for having a debt, one may break a law and make oneself punishable.” (p.271) This leads Heidegger to, “becoming responsible to others”, which comes about “through my having the responsibility for the other’s becoming jeopardised in his existence, led astray, or even destroyed.” (p.271) Thus, “The formal concept of being responsible in the sense of having become responsible to others can be defined as *being-the-ground* for a lack in the Dasein of another” (p.271).

The “lack” we are talking about cannot be something missing because that would refer to something objectively present. Still, “lack” indicates some existential *not-character* (which will be fleshed out later), which gives Heidegger his “formal existential idea of “guilty” as being-the-ground for a being which is determined by a not – that is, *being-the-ground of a nullity*.” (p.272)

The key concept in the next section is the fact that Dasein is thrown, that is, “brought into its there *not* of its own accord. It exists as a potentiality-of-being which belongs to itself, and yet has *not* given itself to itself.” (p.272) Dasein creates itself from its existence, but it had no control over that existence; this is the *not* that lies in the ground of Dasein. Heidegger says that, “Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never existent *before* its ground, but only *from it* and *as it*. Thus being the ground means *never* to gain power over one’s ownmost being from the ground up. This *not* belongs to the existential meaning of thrownness. Being the ground, it itself *is* a nullity of itself… [this] means a not that constitutes this *being* of Dasein, its thrownness.” (p.273) Heidegger calls this the “nullity of being-the-ground”.

There is also another sense in which Dasein is a nullity in its Being. Dasein is a potentiality of Being and as such constantly stands in one possibility over others, that is, “it is constantly *not* other possibilities and has relinquished them in its existentiell project… [Dasein] is itself *as project* essentially *null*.” (p.273) This is the nullity in the “structure of being of projecting” and lies in the “fact of not having chosen and not being able also to choose the others.” (p.273)

This leads to Heidegger proclaiming that through both of the forms of nullity outlined above, “*Care itself is in its essence thoroughly permeated with nullity*” (p.273) which means that “Care, the being of Dasein, thus means, as thrown project: being the (null) ground of a nullity” (pp.273-274) which means that Dasein is guilty according to our earlier definition of guilt.

A couple of points to add to this. First, morality presupposes this ontological understanding of guilt and so Heidegger’s understanding comes “before” terms of right or wrong. Second, since Being-guilty is more primordial than any *knowing* about it Dasein is always guilty, even if it has closed itself off to this possibility in inauthentic Being in the they.

The call of conscience is a call which summons. This summons “calls back by calling forth: *forth* to the possibility of taking over in existence the thrown being that it is, *back* to thrownness in order to understand it as the null ground that it has to take up into existence.” (p.275)

The call of conscience, then, is a summoning to Being-guilty; Dasein “must only *be authentically* the “guilty” that it is… the correct hearing of the summons is tantamount to understanding oneself in one’s ownmost potentiality-of-being, that is, in projecting oneself upon one’s *ownmost* authentic potentiality for becoming guilty.” (p.275)

Understanding the summons means “*wanting to have a conscience*… [in other words] the readiness to be summoned” (p.276)

Heidegger sums up thus; “Conscience is the call of care from the uncanniness of being-in-the-world that summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-for-being guilty.” (p.277)

*Resoluteness*

Wanting to have a conscience is a mode of disclosedness of Dasein. Disclosedness is constituted by attunement, understanding, and discourse. Understanding “discloses one’s own Dasein in the uncanniness of its individuation” (p.283) (Heidegger also refers to understanding as “projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost being-guilty” (p.284)) and this uncanniness “is genuinely disclosed by the attunement of anxiety” (p.283). The discourse of conscience is the call itself which is characterised by *reticence*.

All of these together make up *resoluteness*, which is the “eminent, authentic disclosedness attested in Dasein itself by its conscience – *the reticent projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost being-guilty which is ready for* anxiety… Resoluteness is an eminent mode of the disclosedness of Dasein.” (p.284) As such, it is important to point out that resoluteness is the authentic potentiality-of-Being of Dasein in its *existentiell* attestation.

 Resoluteness, as authentic disclosedness therefore “modifies equiprimordially” the “world” uncovered and the disclosedness of Being-with-others, because “being toward things at hand… and tak[ing] care of things, and the concerned being-with with others is now defined in terms of its ownmost potentiality-of-being-a-self” (p.285) In other words, authentic Being a self, changes everything for Dasein, but nothing ‘external to’ Dasein changes, the change is in the way Dasein stands towards everything.

Heidegger asks the question, “upon what does Dasein resolve itself in resoluteness? To what should it resolve itself?” (p.285) He answers saying that there is no single answer and every factically projected potentiality-of-Being of Dasein is characterised by indefiniteness. Resoluteness is characterised by *existential definiteness* but remains *existentielly indefinite*, by nature.

The place in the world where Dasein carries out this authentic, existentiell projecting into possibilities (which resoluteness makes possible), Heidegger calls *situation*. In the same way that the spatiality of the there is grounded in disclosedness, situation is grounded in resoluteness. “Resoluteness brings the being of the there to the existence of its situation… the call of conscience does not dangle an empty ideal of existence before us when it summons us to our potentiality-of-being, but *calls forth to the situation*.” (p.287)

Chapter Three: The Authentic Potentiality-for-Being-a-Whole of Dasein and Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care

*Anticipatory Resoluteness*

In this section, Heidegger is concerned with bringing together his notions of *anticipation* (Being-toward-death) and *resoluteness* (the concrete situation of acting in Being-guilty). The connection can be clearly seen in the fact that both involve characterisations of the nullity at the heart of Dasein’s Being. Accordingly, human beings cannot be fully authentic as they confront all of their existentiell choices unless and until they grasp the full significance of these nullities.

Resoluteness is the “reticent self-projecting upon one’s ownmost being-guilty, and as demanding anxiety of oneself.” (p.292) Being-guilty is therefore a potentiality-of-Being of Dasein and since projecting oneself onto *any* potentiality-of-Being necessarily involves a complete understanding of all of Dasein’s possibilities, to fully be in its resoluteness, Dasein must embrace the eminent possibility of its impossibility, i.e. death. As Heidegger says, “we revealed the primordial being of Dasein toward its potentiality-of-being as being-toward-death… Thus, resoluteness becomes a primordial being toward the ownmost potentiality-of-being of Dasein only *as anticipatory*.” (p.293)

Death must be included as a core component of the Being of Dasein, i.e. care. “Care contains death and guilt equiprimordially. Only anticipatory resoluteness understands the potentiality-for-being-guilty *authentically and wholly*, that is, *primordially*.” (p.293)

Heidegger sums this up; “Understanding the call of conscience reveals the lostness in the they. Resoluteness beings Dasein back to its ownmost potentiality-of-being-a-self. One’s own potentiality-of-being becomes authentic and transparent in the understanding being-toward-death as one’s *ownmost* possibility.” (p.293)

The way Heidegger sees all this happening is that anticipation is the “*mode* of a potentiality-of-being existentially attested to in Dasein [which is authentically understood as resoluteness]” (p.295). In other words the modalisation of resoluteness by anticipation is the “phenomenal demonstration of an authentic potentiality-of-being-whole of Dasein.” (p.296)

One thing to bear in mind; anticipatory resoluteness is an *existentielly* authentic potentiality-of-Being. This is surprising because *Being and Time* has been all about ontology and existential grounds but we find that the climax results in an existentiell possibility – anticipatory resoluteness.

*The Hermeneutical Situation*

Heidegger clarifies the situation in his fore-structure:

* Dasein has been placed in fore-having with regard to its authentic potentiality-of-being-whole
* The guiding fore-sight, existence, has been clarified through Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-of-being
* Our fore-conception of the existential situation is now clear

But Heidegger wonders whether anticipatory resoluteness, as a possibility Dasein “summons… right out of the ground of its existence” (p.299) is merely an arbitrary one. In other words, “*Does being-in-the-world have a higher instance of its potentiality-of-being than its own death?*” (p.299)

In effect, Heidegger returns to the problem of the ‘circle’ in fundamental ontology. We are looking for the idea of Being in general but to do so we have been working out the Being which belongs to Dasein. The problem is that to complete this task we had to already *presuppose the idea of existence and being in general*.

Heidegger replies that the ““circle” in the proof cannot be “avoided” in the existential analytic, because that analytic is *not* proving anything according to the rules of the logic of consequence *at all*.” (p.301) The “circle” is nothing less than the basic structure of care. Primordially constituted by care Dasein is always already ahead of itself and it has always already projected itself upon possibilities of its existence. ‘Existence’ and ‘being’ are built into the very nature of Dasein and it makes no sense to even think of avoiding this truth in order to get ‘behind them’ to the reality of things because there is no ‘behind’ at all.

“Talk about the “circle” in understanding expresses the failure to recognise two things: (1) That understanding itself constitutes a basic kind of being of Dasein. (2) That this being is constituted as care. To deny the circle, to make a secret of it, or even to wish to overcome it means to anchor this misunderstanding once and for all.” (p.301) Heidegger says we must rather leap into the circle so that we can have a complete view of the circular Being of Dasein. On the contrary, attempting to start with a worldless “I”, presupposes too little and ends up being ontologically inadequate.

*Care and Selfhood*

Thus far, we have built up an articulated picture of Dasein constituted by care which anchors the existential phenomena of death, conscience, and guilt. Now, Heidegger wants to know how we can understand all of this as a unity. For this, he turns to the “I” or “selfhood”.

Kant made a solid attempt at grasping the phenomenal content of this “I” by being clear that “the subject is “consciousness in itself,” not a representation, but rather the “form” of representation… [The “I” is] the formal structure of representing as such, and this formal structure alone makes it possible for anything to be represented.” (p.305)

However, Kant makes the mistake of conceiving of the “I” as an isolated subject which reduces it to something merely objectively present.

Basically, Heidegger concludes by saying that the “I” is authentically itself in the mode of reticent anticipatory resoluteness. He makes a distinction between the inauthentic they-self which keeps saying “I” and the authentic Being-a-self that abides in the reticence of keeping silent. “The self that is revealed by the reticence of resolute existence is the primordial phenomenal basis for the question of the being of the “I”.” (p.308)

*Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care*

Heidegger now turns to look for the meaning of care. “Meaning signifies that upon which the primary project is projected, that in terms of which something can be conceived in its possibility as what it is” (p.309) so in asking about the meaning of care, “we are asking *what makes possible the wholeness of the articulated structural whole of care in the unity of its unfolded articulation?*” (pp.309-310)

The authentic Being-whole of Dasein lies in anticipatory resoluteness and it is from this point that Heidegger proceeds with his questioning:

1. Anticipatory resoluteness is the Being-toward one’s ownmost, eminent potentiality-of-Being. “This letting-*come*-*toward*-*itself* of the eminent possibility that it endures is the primordial phenomenon of the *future*.” (p.311)
2. Anticipatory resoluteness understands Dasein in its essential Being-guilty. This requires that Dasein *be* the thrown ground of a nullity, which means “to authentically *be* Dasein in the *way that it always already was*” (p.311) which means being its *having-been*.
3. Anticipatory resoluteness discloses the actual situation of the there in such a way that existence circumspectly takes care of things at hand in the surrounding world. “[L]etting *what presences* in the surrounding world be encountered in action, is possible only in a *making* that being *present*.” (p.311) This is a present in the sense of *making present*.

This tripartite division, Heidegger calls *temporality*. “This unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having-been is what we call *temporality*… *Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care*” (p.311) and Heidegger even goes further than this; “Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling prey and thus constitutes primordially the wholeness of the structure of care.” (p.313)

Now, Heidegger stresses that temporality is quite different from the inauthentic understanding of time we are familiar with; time as past, present, and future. To treat care as having the meaning of the vulgar sense of time, then “care would be conceived as a being that occurs and elapses “in time.” The *being* of a being having the character of Dasein would then turn into *something objectively present*.” (p.312)

It is also important to note that each of the other two modes of temporality always ‘co-occur’ with the primary mode of temporality for each constitutive factor of care and this is another reason why temporality is not to be confused with the vulgar notion of time.

Stephen Mulhall, in *Heidegger’s Being and Time*, clarifies the way Heidegger’s notion of temporality is different from the vulgar notion of time:

1. Since temporality is the meaning of the Being of Dasein, it can’t be something to which Dasein is related, as if either were something objectively present. Heidegger is not saying that Dasein exists *in* time but that Dasein exists *as* temporality.
2. Since care is an articulated unity the same must be true of temporality.
3. The shift from “time” (which sounds like a thing) to “temporality” (which sounds like a condition or activity) is important because temporality is not a sequence of self-contained moments that move from future to present to past but is, rather, a self-generating process which underpins the Being of Dasein.

Heidegger’s ““future” [as “before” and “ahead of”] does not mean a now that has *not yet* become “actual” and that sometime *will be* for the first time, but the coming in which Dasein comes toward itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being.” (p.311)

Heidegger’s “having-been” [in the sense of “already”] encapsulates the idea that Dasein is always already something thrown. “Only because care is grounded in having-been, can Dasein exist as the thrown being that it is.” (p.313) Dasein is never past (we reserve that description for beings unlike Dasein that are no longer objectively present), but it is “the being that, still existing it already was, that is, that it constantly *is* as having been.” (p.313)

Heidegger’s “making present” is the “*primary* basis for the *falling prey* to things at hand and objectively present that we take care of” (p.313) and is included in the future and having-been.

In the same way that the Being of Dasein (care) is not a being, temporality is also not a being. Care is manifest in Dasein as its (articulated) Being and Heidegger seems to be saying something similar about temporality. The way temporality “manifests” is in the way it *temporalizes* itself.

To understand this we need to refer to the way Heidegger talks of future, having-been, and present as showing “the phenomenal characteristics of “toward itself”, “back to,” “letting something be encountered” (p.314) and specifically to the fact that he refers to these three ‘modes’ of temporality as *ecstasies*. The *ecstasies* articulate temporality in a similar way to the way existence, facticity, and falling prey articulate care. As Heidegger says, the essence of temporality is “temporalizing in the unity of the *ecstasies*.” (p.314)

The notion of the future (in Heidegger’s ‘temporal’ sense) has an interesting consequence. “The authentic future, which is temporalized primarily by *that* temporality which constitutes the meaning of anticipatory resoluteness, thus reveals itself *as finite*.” (p.315) It is finite because it (as part of the meaning of care) is Being-toward-the-end. But, what does this mean? Surely, time continues to go on even though this Dasein is-no-longer. Heidegger answers yes. And this is where his ontic/ontological distinction becomes important once more. The temporal mode of future is a phenomenal quality that “shows itself in what is projected in the primordial existential project of Dasein.” (p.315)

For Heidegger, “the future has priority in the ecstatic unity of primordial and authentic temporality… [since] Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes itself out of the authentic future, and indeed in such a way that, futurally having-been, it first arouses the present. *The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future*.” (p.314) This makes sense when we consider the fact that resoluteness is anticipatory.

Heidegger summarises this section with the following theses:

1. Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality, and makes possible the constitution of the structure of care.
2. Temporality is essentially ecstatic.
3. Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future.
4. Primordial time is finite.

Chapter Four: Temporality and Everydayness

Having analysed the meaning of care as temporality, Heidegger will now revisit all those structures and constituents he previously outlined, re-interpreting them in terms of temporality. He will cover disclosedness, Being-in-the-world, worldliness, and spatiality.

*The Temporality of Disclosedness*

In seeking to interpret disclosedness temporally we need to investigate four separate constituents; “Disclosedness constitutes a being in such a way that, existing, it can itself be its “there”… [It’s structural moments are] understanding, attunement, entanglement, and discourse. Every understanding has its mood. Every attunement understands. Attuned understanding has the characteristic of entanglement. Entangled, attuned understanding articulates itself with regard to its intelligibility in discourse.” (pp.320-321)

Each structural moment of disclosedness temporalises itself primarily in one ecstatic mode but it could not do this unless it was temporal and that means that it is equiprimordially determined by the other two ecstatic modes at the same time. The following table shows the temporal interpretations of disclosedness:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Authentic | Inauthentic |
| Understanding(Future)(Present)(Having-Been) | Authentic understanding means, “*to be projecting toward a potentiality-of-being for the sake of which Dasein always exists*.” (p.321) It is a way of holding oneself in an existentiell possibility. Temporally, this is a *coming-toward-oneself*. Heidegger characterises this as **anticipation**.This coincides with *Being-ahead-of-itself* of care.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------“To the anticipation of resoluteness there belongs a present in accord with which a resolution discloses the situation… We call the *present* that is held in authentic temporality… the ***Moment***.” [boldface added] (p.323)Heidegger stresses that the Moment is not the *now*. “The now is a temporal phenomenon that belongs to time as within-time-ness” the now “in which” something comes into being, passes away, or is objectively present. “In the Moment” nothing can happen, but as an authentic present it lets us *encounter for the first time* what can be “in a time” as something at hand or objectively present.” (p.323)The Moment temporalizes itself out of the authentic future.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Authentic understanding is at the same time a coming back to the thrown self. Since authentic projecting allows Dasein to “re-experience” that initial act of thrownness, in a sense, Heidegger calls this **repetition**.  | Inauthentic understanding “projects itself upon what can be taken care of… in the business of everyday activity.” (p.322) Dasein doesn’t “come toward itself primarily in its ownmost, nonrelational potentiality-of-being, but it *awaits this* heedfully” (p.322). This is **awaiting**. *Expecting* is only possible because Dasein is awaiting its potentiality-of-Being.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The inauthentic present is a **making present**. This is a temporal mode of “falling prey to the “world” taken care of. Inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself in terms of making present.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Inauthentic understanding is characterised by a **forgetting** of itself in thrown potentiality-of-being.This is not forgetting in the sense of a failure to remember, rather, it is “a “positive,” ecstatic mode of having-been… [with] the character of backing away *from* one’s ownmost having-been in a way that is closed off from oneself.” (p.324)*Remembering* is only possible on the basis of forgetting. |
|  | Authentic understanding is an anticipating repetition that holds fast to a Moment | Inauthentic understanding is an awaiting which forgets and makes present |
|  | Authentic (Anxiety) | Inauthentic (Fear) |
|  | Since attunement is a having-been, the fundamental nature of mood is a *bringing back to*…. |
| Attunement(Having-Been)(Present)(Future) | The cause of anxiety is not something innerworldly, but rather Dasein itself. In anxiety, beings in the surrounding world lose their relevance and the world sinks into insignificance. “Anxiety is anxious about naked Dasein thrown into uncanniness. It brings one back to the sheer That of one’s ownmost, individuated thrownness.” (p.328)This has neither the character of a forgetting nor a remembering but it isn’t fully resolute either. “***Bringing before the possibility of repetition*** *is the specific ecstatic mode of the attunement of the having-been that constitutes anxiety*.” [boldface added] (p.328) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The present of anxiety does not have the character of Moment that temporalizes itself in resolution, rather, it is **maintained**. “Anxiety only brings one into the mood for a *possible* resolution. The present of anxiety holds the Moment *in readiness*” (p.328). ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Anxiety reveals the nullity of what can be taken care of, that is, the impossibility of projecting oneself upon a potentiality-of-being primarily based upon what is taken care of.” (p.328) However, this revelation also **reveals “the possibility of an authentic potentiality-of-being… as something futural in repetition**.” [boldface added] (p.328).  | Isn’t fear about the future? Aren’t we afraid of something happening in the future? Yes, but in fear, “the awaiting of fear lets what is threatening *come back* to one’s potentiality-of-being factically taking care of things. Only if that to which this comes back is already ecstatically open, can what is threatening be awaited *back* *to* the being that I am…” (p.326) The character of fear comes from the fact that Dasein is afraid “for itself”.In fearing, Dasein “leaps from one thing to the other, because it **forgets** itself and thus cannot take hold of any *definite* possibility.” [boldface added] (p.326) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The making present is manifest in fear but it is modified by having-been. All “possible” possibilities offer themselves to Dasein in fear so that the surrounding world is encountered “in the mode of no longer knowing one’s way around in *it*.” (p.327) Dasein “strays back and forth between ungrasped “worldly” possibilities.” (p.328) Heidegger calls this **confused making present**. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The future is also manifest in fear but it is modified by having-been into **awaiting**.  |
|  | Anxiety arises from the *future* of resolutenessThe future and the present of anxiety temporalize themselves out of a primordial having-been in the sense of bringing us back to the possibility of repetition. | Fear arises from the lost present of which fear is apprehensive |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Inauthentic |
| Falling Prey - Curiosity(Present)(Future)(Having-Been) | Curiosity is grounded in letting something be encountered. However, curiosity doesn’t “make present what is objectively present in order to *understand* it by lingering with it, but it seeks to see *only* in order to see and have seen… It makes present for the sake of the present.” (p.331)Heidegger calls this dispersed not-lingering a *never dwelling anywhere* and identifies it as the most extreme opposite phenomenon to Moment. As soon as this making present catches sight of anything, it has already lost interest and has moved onto the next thing. Falling prey is rooted in the **making present**.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------“Greed for the new indeed penetrates to something not yet seen, but in such a way that making present attempts to withdraw from awaiting.” (p.331) Curiosity is futural in the mode of **awaiting**, but “in such a way that it does not await a *possibility*, but in its greed only desires possibility as something real… “Arising” is an ecstatic modification of awaiting in such a way that awaiting *pursues* making present.” (p.331)--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------In curiosity, the temporal mode of having-been is characterised by **forgetting**. |

Regarding discourse, Heidegger says that this structure doesn’t temporalize itself in a definite ecstasis because the complete disclosedness of the there is articulated by it. However, since “discourse is for the most part spoken in language and initially speaks by addressing the “surrounding world” in taking care of it and talking about it, *making present* has, of course, a *privileged* constitutive function.” (p.333)

In addition to this, it can be noted that since all discourse is tensed, discourse is in essentially temporal.

In a summary of this section, Heidegger says that, “*temporality temporalizes itself completely in every ecstasis; that is, in the ecstatic unity of the actual, complete, temporalizing of temporality the wholeness of the structural whole of existence, facticity, and falling prey is grounded – that is the unity of the structure of care*. Temporalizing does not mean a “succession” of the ecstasies. The future is *not later* than the having-been, and the having-been is *not earlier* than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future that makes present, in the process of having-been.” (p.334)

*The Temporality of Circumspect Taking Care*

In this section, Heidegger is searching for a connection between taking care (as the kind of Being of Dasein) and things taken care of (as innerworldly things at hand). Heidegger identifies this connecting strand as temporality.

Taking care of things in the world is predicated on relevance which indicates the kind of Being of things at hand. The relational character of relevance we identified as being a with its… together with…. “*If letting things be relevant constitutes the existential structure of taking care, and if the latter as being together with… belongs to the essential constitution of care, and if care in its turn is grounded in temporality, then the existential condition of the possibility of letting something be relevant must be sought in a mode of the temporalizing of temporality*.” (p.337)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| Taking Care – Letting Something Be Relevant(Present)(Future)(Having-Been) | Heidegger attributes the **making present** of taking care to *awaiting*the context and *retaining*the means of relevance. Making present results in the specifically handy way the useful thing is encountered.Retaining what is relevant does not mean a holding to it thematically in the same way that awaiting is not focused on anything thematically.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------“Relevance has an intentional character with reference to which the thing is usable or in use. Understanding the intention and context of relevance has the temporal structure of **awaiting**. Awaiting the intention, taking care can at the same time come back to something like relevance.” [boldface added] (p.337)Awaiting is not focused on the “goal”, nor an expectation of the work to be produced; it is not a thematic grasping at all. Rather, it is the way being relevant “makes the characteristic absorption in taking care in the world of its useful things possible.” (p.337) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Dasein **retains** the means of relevance. There is also a “specific kind of *forgetting* [that] is essential for the temporality that constitutes being in relevance. In order to be able to “really” get to work, “lost” in the world of tools and to handle them, the self must forget itself.” [boldface added] (p.337) |
|  | “…being relevant constitutes itself in the unity of awaiting and retaining in such a way that the making present arising from this makes the characteristic absorption in taking care in the world of its useful things possible.” (p.337)“The making present that awaits and retains constitutes the familiarity in accordance with which Dasein “knows its way around” as being-with-one-another in the public surrounding world.” (p.337) |

At this point, Heidegger reminds us that useful things precisely *cannot* be encountered as they are in-themselves through heedful circumspection but are rather encountered in the *deficient* modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy.

Now, things which can’t be used, e.g. a tool which is damaged, can only become conspicuous to and for someone who actually uses them. No thing at hand encountered without the totality of relevance could ever appear as conspicuous, for there would be no referential context in which it *could* appear so. But what does this mean ontologically?

It means that the “making present that awaits and retains is held up with regard to its absorption in the relevant relations…” (p.338). The making present “which equiprimordially awaits the what-for, is held fast with the tool used in such a way that the what-for and the in-order-to are now explicitly encountered for the first time… However, making present itself can only meet up with something unsuited for… because it is already moving in an awaiting retention of what is in relevance.” (p.338)

*The Temporal Meaning of the Way in which Circumspect Taking Care Becomes Modified into the Theoretical Discovery of That Which is Present Within the World (Scientifically)*

In this section Heidegger is asking, “which of those conditions of possibility in the constitution of being of Dasein are existentially necessary for Dasein to be able to exist in the mode of scientific investigation?” (p.340) In other words, he is aiming at an *existential concept of science*, i.e. “science as a mode of existence and thus a mode of being-in-the-world which discovers or discloses beings or being.” (p.340)

First of all, science is not merely the ‘objectifying’ of things at hand. Heidegger says this is no case of a *disappearance* of praxis, rather theoretical research is steeped in praxis that involves heedful circumspection; the technological set-up for experiments, pen and paper used to record notes, etc. This highlights the totality of relevance that must always already be disclosed in order for things at hand to be interpreted in the mode of scientific investigation.

The circumspection of taking care in this case brings things at hand nearer to Dasein in a way Heidegger calls *deliberation*. “The schema peculiar to it is “if-then”: if this or that is to be produced, put into use, or prevented, for example, then we need these or those means, ways, circumstances, or opportunities.” (p.342) This has the existential meaning of *making present***.** In full, circumspect making present “belongs to the full ecstatic unity of temporality. It is grounded in a ***retention*** of the context of useful things that Dasein takes care of in ***awaiting*** a possibility. What has already been disclosed in awaiting retention is brought nearer by one’s deliberative making present…” [boldface added] (p.342)

The point is that deliberation “only gets brought near… in such a way that it circumspectly lets that through which something is in relevance be seen *as* this.” (p.343)

Heidegger uses the example of a hammer. If we say that the hammer is heavy, we are treating it as a being with ‘mass’, not as a tool. “Circumspect talk about being “too heavy” or “too light” no longer has any “meaning”” (p.343) The hammer has been encountered in a ‘new’ way; “transformed” into something objectively present.

However, Heidegger also stresses; “Things at hand need not lose their character of being useful things in order to become the “object” of a science.” (p.344) It would seem that things at hand *can’t* lose their character of being useful even when they become the “object” of a science.

Heidegger also talks about mathematics as the classic example of the development of a science. Using the guidelines he has already laid out, Heidegger says that what is important for its development “lies neither in its higher evaluation of the observation of “facts,” nor in the “application” of mathematics in determining events of nature, but the *mathematical projection of nature itself*.” (p.345) Nature is being uncovered in light of a mathematical ‘horizon’, which is a project which “discloses an *a priori*… the thematic beings are discovered in *the only* way that beings can be discovered: in the prior project of their constitution of being.” (p.345)

Heidegger calls this prior project of the constitution of the Being of beings in the mode of scientific investigation, *thematization*. “Thematization objectifies. It does not first “posit” beings, but frees them in such a way that they become “objectively” subject to questioning and definition.” (pp.345-346)

Thematization (as Being together with innerworldly things objectively present) *makes present* in a different way from circumspection. The discovering of science “solely awaits the discoveredness of what is present. This awaiting of discoveredness is grounded existentielly in a resoluteness of Dasein by means of which it projects itself upon its potentiality-of-being-in-the-“truth.”” (p.346)

Heidegger summarises the “scientific projection of nature” as the “thematization of what is present” (p.346).

*The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World*

Finally, Heidegger addresses the relation between Dasein and world. How are world and the Being of Dasein connected?

He asserts that if Being together with innerworldly beings (either theoretical or practical) is possible, it must only be possible because Dasein transcends the beings thematized. Heidegger poses the question here as; “In what way must world *be*, such that Dasein can exist as being-in-the-world?” (p.347)

The totality of relevance inherent in circumspect taking care is made up of the relations in-order-to, what-for, for-that, and for-the-sake-of-which. The connection of these relations is significance and their unity is world. Since world is disclosed in the disclosedness of the there and this latter is grounded in temporality, the unity of significance (world) must also be grounded in temporality. This must mean that temporality has something like a “field” within which Dasein is able to project itself upon its possibilities. Heidegger calls this “field” a *horizon*.

Since temporality is a three-fold ecstatic structure (future, having-been, present) then it must be within these ecstasies that the *horizonal schema* is manifest. “The ecstasies are not simply raptures toward…. Rather, a “whereto” of being transported belongs to each ecstasy. We call this whereto of the ecstasy the horizonal schema.” (p.347)

The horizonal schema that accords to each ecstasy is as follows:

* The schema in which Dasein comes back to itself futurally is the *for-the-sake-of-itself*
* The schema in which Dasein is disclosed to itself in attunement as thrown (having-been), is that *in the face of which* it has been thrown
* The schema in which Dasein is existing for-the-sake-of-itself in being delivered over to itself as thrown, and is at the same time making present as being together with… is determined by the *in-order-to*

“The horizon of the whole of temporality determines *that upon which* the being factically existing is essentially *disclosed*… a potentiality-of-being is always projected in the horizon of the future, “already being” is disclosed in the horizon of the having-been, and what is taken care of is discovered in the horizon of the present.” (pp.347-348)

It is now clear that it is only because of the horizonal unity of the schemata of the ecstasies that the in-order-to and the for-the-sake-of-which are connected. The in-order-to and the for-the-sake-of-which are the significance which is world. This means that the horizonal unity underpins and makes possible world.

This interweaving of Dasein and world on the basis of temporality again serves to illustrate the point that “Insofar as Dasein temporalizes itself, a world *is*, too… If no Dasein exists, no world is “there” either.” (p.348) It is also worth noting that “The world is neither objectively present nor at hand, but temporalizes itself in temporality. It “is” “there” together with the outside-itself of the ecstasies.” (p.348)

The world is transcendent [as entity-transcending], grounded in the horizonal unity of ecstatic temporality. It must already be ecstatically disclosed so that innerworldly beings can be encountered from it. Temporality already holds itself ecstatically in the horizons of its ecstasies and, temporalizing itself, comes back to the beings encountered in the there.” (p.348) It is here that factical Dasein (self-transcending, in the sense that it actualises possibilities) finds itself always already encountering innerworldly beings within the limits of its thrownness. “Only *what*, in *which* direction, *to what extent*, *and how* it actually discovers and discloses is a matter of freedom” (p.348).

Heidegger makes clear that, “The relations of significance that determine the structure of the world are thus not a network of forms that is imposed upon some material by a worldless subject. Rather, factical Dasein, ecstatically understanding itself and its world in the unity of the there, comes back from these horizons to the beings encountered in them.” (p.348)

Heidegger ends this section by answering the question “what makes it ontologically possible for being to be encountered within the world and objectified as encountered being?... If the “subject” is conceived ontologically as existing Dasein, whose being is grounded in temporality, we must say then that the world is “subjective.” But this “subjective” world, as one that is temporally transcendent, is then “more objective” than any possible “object.” (p.349)

*The Temporalty of the Spatiality Characteristic of Dasein*

If the Being of Dasein is determined by temporality, it must also be determined by spatiality. This is not quite true.

Dasein is not present “in space” like things at hand. Rather the spatiality of Dasein (what Heidegger calls “making room”) is constituted by directionality and de-distancing. This, Heidegger says, is existentially possible on the basis of temporality in the following way. This kind of spatiality discovers a *region*. A ‘region’ is the “whereto of the possible belonging somewhere of useful things at hand in the surrounding world.” (p.350) It is a ‘practical space’, in which Dasein heedfully and circumspectly takes care of things at hand.

This *belonging somewhere* is the crucial point because it is always discovered within a context of relevance of the useful things taken care of and, as we have already seen, “relevant relations are intelligible only in the horizon of a disclosed world.” (p.351) The horizonal schema of temporality therefore makes possible the specific horizon of the whereto of regional belonging. In short, spatiality is grounded in temporality.

Naturally we can map the horizonal schema of making room as well:

* The schema in which making room is an awaiting of region (future) is a *de-distancing* (or bringing-near) of things at hand and objectively present. “De-distancing, taking care comes back out of the previously discovered region to what is nearest.” (p.351)
* The schema in which making room directionally discovers region (through bringing-near and estimating/measuring distances) is a *making present*.
* The schema in which bringing-close makes possible the handling and taking care of things at hand entangles Dasein in falling prey “making present loses itself in itself, and *forgets* the over there.” [italics added] (p.351)

 Heidegger describes all of this as “the forgetting that awaits pursues the present.” (p.351)

Chapter Five: Temporality and Historicity

Heidegger points out that so far, we have focused almost entirely on *Being-toward-the-end* (death) as *the* end of Dasein, but this is only *one* of the ends of Dasein. The other “end” is the beginning. “Only the being “between” birth and death presents the whole we are looking for.” (p.356)

We must now look, not only at Being-toward-the-beginning, but also at “the way Dasein *stretches along between* birth and death. Precisely the “connection of life,” in which, after all, Dasein constantly somehow holds itself” (p.356).

A key point of Heidegger’s philosophy in this section is that, understood existentially, “birth is never something past in the sense of what is no longer present, and death is just as far from having the kind of being of something outstanding that is not yet present but will come. Factical Dasein exists as being born, and in being born it is also already dying in the sense of being-toward-death. Both “ends” and their “between” *are* as long as Dasein factically exists” (p.357).

Referring to what Heidegger calls the “stretching along” of Dasein, or its “betweenness”, or its “connectedness of life”, he looks at what he calls Dasein’s “movement of existence”, which is “not the motion of something objectively present. It is determined from the stretching along of Dasein. The specific movement of the *stretched out stretching itself along*, we call the *occurrence* of Dasein… To expose the *structure of occurrence* and the existential and temporal conditions of its possibility means to gain an *ontological* understanding of *historicity*.” (p.358)

*Note: The MacQuarrie & Robinson translation translates “occurrence” as “historizing”. From here on I will adopt this translation instead as I find it facilitates easier understanding. I will also amend direct quotes from the Stambaugh translation substituting “historizing” for “occurrence”.*

In this section, Heidegger also emphasises that he is separating “historicity” (the “way” Dasein is (or the Being of Dasein) “between” birth and death) from “historiography” (which is basically the ‘science’ of history). Historicity, founded in temporality, is the ontological foundation for history.

*The Vulgar Understanding of History and the Historizing (Occurrence) of Dasein*

Heidegger begins by looking at what “history” actually means in everyday usage and concludes that it primarily means “something *past*” (p.360). He further breaks “past” down into four meanings:

1. No longer present (but still having an effect on the present)
2. A part of a sequence, events take place in (past-present-future) where events in the “past” are causally related to events in the “future”
3. A ‘collective’ understanding of how cultures have changed “in time”
4. What has been “handed down”

Heidegger synthesises these into a single definition; “history is the specific historizing [occurrence] of existing Dasein happening in time, in such a way that the historizing – which in being-with-one-another is “past” and, at the same time, “handed down” and still having an effect” (p.361).

Heidegger next turns to specific things (“antiquities”) to understand exactly *how* these things can be historical “when they are, after all, *not yet* past” (p.362). He can’t find anything *in* or directly related to the things themselves that would account for their being historical which leads him to conclude that the past we talk about when referring to things in themselves is nothing other “than the *world* within which they were encountered as things at hand belonging to a context of useful things and used by heedful Dasein existing-in-the-world. That *world* is no longer. But what was previously *innerworldly* in that world is still objectively present. As useful things belonging to that world, what is *now* still objectively present can nevertheless belong to the “*past.”*” (p.362)

Since world *is* only in the mode of existing Dasein (as Being-in-the-world) then the Being of historical beings is grounded in the past of that Dasein to whose world that past belonged. In short, useful things are historical on the ground of belonging to a world, but “world” is only historical because it constitutes an ontological determination of Dasein. “Dasein is what is primarily historical.” (p.363)

Heidegger calls beings unlike Dasein that are historical through belonging to the world, “world-historical.” They are historical only by being encountered in the world by a being that is primarily historical, i.e. Dasein.

However; “According to this, only “past” Dasein would be historical, but not “present” Dasein.” (p.363) However, since Dasein can never be (objectively) present, it can also never be past (because being “past” (as in “no-longer-present”) or “present” is something that only objectively present beings can be); instead, Dasein *exists*. A Dasein that no-longer-exists is a *having-been-there*.

The important question Heidegger next asks is, does Dasein become historical *only* by no-longer-being-there or is it rather, always already historical? “*Is Dasein something that has been only in the sense of having-been-there, or has it been as something making present and futural, that is, in the temporalizing of its temporality?*” (p.363)

The fact that beings do not become “more historical” the further “into the past” they recede from the “present” is the insight that reveals that historicity (as constitutive of beings like Dasein) has nothing to do with “time”, “not because they [Daseins] are not “in time” or are timeless, but rather because they *primordially* exist *temporally in a way that* nothing objectively present “in time,” whether passing away or coming into being, could ever, by its ontological essence, be…” (p.365)

Dasein does not ‘become’ historical by dying because its very Being is care, which is temporality temporalizing itself, that is, a being that is futural and has-been in its making present. In short, to exist for Dasein is to be historical.

*The Essential Constitution of Historicity*

Next, Heidegger turns his attention to finding a “historizing” (occurrence), in the scope of temporality, that determines existence as historical. He first investigates what an authentic historizing of Dasein might look like.

Resoluteness is “self-projection upon one’s own being guilty that is reticent and ready for anxiety. It attains its authenticity as *anticipatory* resoluteness.” (p.364) Such an existential outline cannot, in principle, discuss what Dasein *factically* resolves upon. However, we can ask from whence the possibilities that Dasein projects itself on arise. “Anticipatory self-projection upon the insuperable possibility of existence – death – guarantees only the totality and authenticity of resoluteness. But the factically disclosed possibilities of existence are not to be learned from death.” (p.365)

“The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself discloses the actual factical possibilities of authentic existing *in terms of the heritage* which that resoluteness *takes over* as thrown. Resolute coming back to thrownness involves *handing oneself over* to traditional possibilities, although not necessarily *as* traditional ones.” (p.365)

Heidegger sees Being-toward-death and, what he calls here ‘heritage’, as being two modes of Being which work together in producing anticipatory resoluteness. Being-toward-death focuses our existential project and clarifies the way things are for Dasein; “Only being free *for* death gives Dasein its absolute goal and pushes existence into its finitude. The finitude of existence thus seized upon tears one back out of endless multiplicity of closest possibilities offering themselves – those of comfort, shirking and taking things easy – and brings Dasein to the simplicity of its *fate*.” (p.365)

Our *heritage*, on the other hand, looks the other way, to our beginnings, to the cultural, familial, and traditional milieu into which we were thrown (which we have therefore *inherited*), and which creates the boundaries for and conditions the possibilities we project ourselves into. It is these conditioning factors that influence what Heidegger calls our *fate*, or the disclosing of Dasein as “being-in-the-world for the “coming” of “fortunate” circumstances and for the cruelty of chance.” (p.366)

Heidegger distinguishes between *fate* and *destiny* in that the former is reserved for the individual whereas the latter describes “fateful Dasein… as being-in-the-world in being-with others” (p.366).

There is an optimistic tinge to Heidegger at this point where he suggests that if we embrace and accept the finitude of our freedom, our *powerlessness*, (towards our past as conditioned and towards our future when we will die) then we achieve some kind of power over our existence, not through having complete control over our lives but through accepting the limitations we must live within and choosing from the factical possibilities presented before us. “If Dasein, anticipating, lets death become powerful in itself, then, as free for death, it understands itself in its own *higher power* of its finite freedom. In this way it takes over the *powerlessness* of being abandoned to itself in that freedom, which always only *is* in having chosen the choice, and it becomes clear about the chance elements in the situation disclosed.” (p.366)

Fate, for Heidegger, becomes a way for Dasein to transform its thrown powerlessness into something more positive through a ‘higher’ perspective (“higher power”) that is a “making itself available for adversities, the power of reticent self-projection, ready for anxiety, upon one’s own being-guilty… Only if death, guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude live together equiprimordially in the being of a being, as they do in care, can that being exist in the mode of fate, that is, be historical in the ground if its existence.” (p.366)

In summary; “*Only a being that is essentially futural in its being so that it can let itself be thrown back upon its factical there, free for its death and shattering itself on it, that is, only a being that, as futural, is equiprimordially* ***having-been****, can hand down to itself its inherited possibility, take over its own thrownness and be* ***in the Moment*** *for its time.” Only authentic temporality that is at the same time finite makes something like fate, that is, authentic historicity, possible.*” (p.366)

Next, Heidegger discusses *repetition*, which refers to the way Dasein returns to itself and hands itself down in relation to the “possibilities of the Dasein that has been there.” (p.367) What is repeated in repetition is the “possibility of existence that has been handed down” (p.367), but he is quick to emphasise that this is not a mere copying of what someone has done before, but that repetition “*responds* to the possibility of existence that has been-there… Repetition neither abandons itself to the past, nor does it aim at progress. In the Moment, authentic existence is indifferent to both of these alternatives.” (p.367)

For Heidegger, repetition is “the mode of resolution handing itself down, by which Dasein exists explicitly as fate… [which means that history is grounded] in the authentic occurrence [historizing] of existence that arises from the *future* of Dasein… *Authentic being-toward-death, that is, the finitude of temporality, is the concealed ground of the historicity of Dasein*. Dasein does not first become historical in repetition, but rather because as temporal it is historical, it can take itself over in its history, retrieving itself.” (p.367)

*The Historicity of Dasein and World History (Inauthentic Historicity)*

Heidegger says that “[t]he thesis of the historicity of Dasein does not say that the worldless subject is historical, but that what is historical is the being that exists as being-in-the-world. *The occurrence [historizing] of history is the occurrence [historizing] of being-in-the-world*. The historicity of Dasein is essentially the historicity of the world…” (p.369).

An important consequence of this is that “*With the existence of historical being-in-the-world, things at hand and present have always already been drawn into the history of the world.*” (p.369) This means that innerworldly beings themselves *are* historical. Heidegger calls these beings *world-historical*.

“[S]ince factical Dasein is absorbed and entangled in what it takes care of, it initially understands its history as world history… [and since this vulgar understanding of Being understands itself as objective presence] the being of what is world-historical is experienced and interpreted in the sense of objective presence that arrives, is present, and disappears.” (p.370)

Inauthentically existing, Dasein calculates its history in terms of what it takes care of, so “if Dasein wants to come to itself, it must first *pull itself together* from the *dispersion* and the *disconnectness* of what has just “happened,” [an entangled interpretation of history]… [to understand] Dasein’s “connectedness” in the sense of the unity with which experiences are linked together between birth and death.” (p.371)

It is resoluteness that Heidegger defines as a “*steadiness that has been stretched along*” which allows Dasein, as fate, to incorporate birth and death and their “between” into its existence in such a way that “it is in the Moment for what is world-historical in its actual situation.” (p.371) The constancy, or “steadiness,” of existence, “is not first formed either through or by “Moments” adjoining each other, but rather the Moments arise from the temporality, *already stretched along*, of that repetition which is futurally in the process of having-been.” (p.372)

In short, inauthentic historicity, in concealing this stretching along of fate, is blind to its possibilities and incapable of retrieving what has been. It is lost in the making present of the today, understanding its “past” in terms of its “present”. In contrast, the temporality of authentic historicity is a Moment that anticipates and retrieves.

Chapter Six: Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time

Heidegger now wants to investigate the way Dasein relates to time in ordinary life as something objectively present, e.g. as something we can “have” or “lose”. Specifically, he wants to know how this “vulgar” conception of time relates to temporality as it has been conceived existentially.

*The Temporality of Dasein and Taking Care of Time*

Heidegger reminds us that circumspect taking care of “is grounded in temporality, in the mode of making present that awaits and retains.” (p.387) He structures these three ecstasies in the following way:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ecstasis | Inclusion of other ecstasies | Horizon | Relational Structure |
| Awaiting | *Then* (Future) | A making present that awaitingly retains (“Now not yet”) | Later on | *Then, when…* |
| Making present | *Now* (Present) | Making present in a unity with awaiting and retaining:- forgetting (“Now, now”) or awaiting:- (“Just now”) | Today | *Now, that…* |
| Retaining | *On that former occasion* (Past) | Retaining is a making present that awaits (“Now no longer”) | Earlier | *On that former occasion, when…* |

The new information comes in the “relational structure” column which Heidegger calls *datability*. It is this everyday understanding of time as datability that Heidegger wants to examine further.

First, as we have already seen, Dasein understands time primarily through the making present that awaits and retains. This making present is a “making present that interprets itself, that is, what has been interpreted and addressed in the “now,” is what we call “time.” (p.389)

Secondly, we *can’t* express events in any other way than through datability. This is what Heidegger means when he says temporality interpreting itself. Every “now” is automatically and unavoidably a “now that…” This happens because the “now” interprets a *making present* of beings. The ecstatic nature (making present) of the present is revealed in datability. Heidegger goes so far as to call datability the “*reflex* of the *ecstatic* constitution of temporality” (p.389) Interpreted time always already comes with a date-stamp and because of this “Dasein has always already been disclosed to itself as being-in-the-world, and innerworldly beings have been discovered along with it” (p.389).

The horizons (later on, today, earlier) also have the character of datability (today when…, earlier when…, and later on when…).

The *in-between* of Dasein’s awaiting can be analysed in a similar fashion. In understanding what it is awaiting in terms of making present gives us a “now not yet” concealed in the “then.” This relation of the datability of this *in-between* is expressed in the “meanwhile.”

Similarly, “during” is a function of subdividing the “until then” into a number of “from then… until thens”. This “during” reveals the *stretched-alongness* of Dasein in historical temporality and is interpreted with a “span.”

Inauthentic existence “temporalizes itself in the mode of a making present that does not await but forgets.” (pp.390-391) Such a person loses himself in what is taken care of but also “*loses his time* in them, too” (p.391) By contrast, authentic existence “always has time” as the “Moment’s authentic making present of the situation… is *maintained* in the future that has-been.” (p.391)

*“Factically thrown Dasein can “take” and lose time for itself only because a “time” is allotted to it as temporality ecstatically stretched along with the disclosedness of the there grounded in that temporality.”* (p.391)

One last point Heidegger makes in this section is that “time interpreted and expressed by any particular Dasein is thus also always already *made public* as such on the basis of its ecstatic being-in-the-world.” (p.391) This means that, although each individual Dasein “dates” time differently (now that this or that happens), the “now” expressed is always interpreted the same way.

*Time Taken Care of and Within-Timeness*

Now Heidegger wants to understand the phenomenal character of this time that makes itself public for Being-in-the-world.

Public time is the time in which innerworldly beings are encountered. Heidegger therefore calls these beings unlike Dasein, beings *within-time*.

Heidegger then goes on to relate an “insight” into how public time was derived. “Although taking care of time can be carried out in the mode of dating that we characterised as based on events in the surrounding world, this always occurs in the horizon of a taking care of time that we know as astronomical and calendrical *time-reckoning*.” (p.392)

The essence of this story is that Dasein uses the sun (daylight) to reckon time because it is only during daylight hours that it can work (take care of things in the world). Through Dasein’s circumspect taking care of things, it interprets time as datable and the relations of significance naturally emerge from this way of thinking. The first clock thus emerges from the fact that Dasein’s existence is worldly. And worldliness is founded on the care structure which is ultimately founded on temporality. In short, temporality is not grounded in the clock, the clock is grounded in temporality and only possible because temporality temporalizes itself.

Heidegger concludes that time taken care of is structured in the following ways; it is datable, spanned, public, and it belongs to the world itself (worldliness).

The fact that we have developed ever more advanced ‘artificial clocks’ doesn’t alter any of this because they are still based on the ‘natural clock’ primordial Dasein first used to measure time.

Turning to these ‘artificial clocks’, Heidegger then asks how *time* can be found in them. There is nothing about the moving hands of a clock that, in and of itself, is time. Rather, when we look at the clock we immediately interpret it in terms of datedness, spannedness, publicness, and worldliness. Heidegger calls it a “now-saying” (we say, *now* it is time to, or there is still time to…, etc.) which is the “discoursing articulation of a *making present* that temporalizes itself in unity with an awaiting that retains.” (p.396)

Dating takes up a relation with something present and is a form of measuring. Measuring involves a standard which is constant for everyone. Dating and measuring time is a way of making it present which grants a special privilege to the “now”. “This time “universally” accessible in clocks is found as an *objectively present multiplicity of nows*” (p.397).

Now Heidegger points out that the “temporality of factical being-in-the-world is what primordially makes the opening up of space possible” (p.397). The datability of time is thus bound up with the location of Dasein in what is taken care of. Hence, “temporality is the condition of the possibility that dating may be bound up with the spatially-local… Time is not first coupled with space, but the “space” that is supposedly to be coupled with it is encountered only on the basis of temporality taking care of time.” (p.397)

In measuring time, we always say, “now” but in doing so, we ‘forget’ what has been measured and find only distance and number. In this way time is never thematically present for Dasein.

World time (as the time in which what is present moves) is not objective because it is clearly not present-in-itself, but neither is it subjective as in occurring in a “subject”. “*World time is “more objective” than any possible object because, with the disclosedness of the world, it always already becomes ecstatically and horizonally “objectified” as the condition of the possibility of innerworldly beings… But world time is also “more subjective” than any possible subject because it first makes possible the being of the factically existing self, that being which, as is now well understood, is the meaning of care.*” (p.399)

Time is neither in the subject nor the object, but rather “it “is” “*prior*” to every subjectivity and objectivity, because it presents the condition of the very possibility of this “prior.”” (p.399)

*Within-Timeness and the Genesis of the Vulgar Concept of Time*

The mode of behaviour in which Dasein orients itself towards time is in the use of the clock. “The existential and temporal meaning of the clock turns out to be a making present of the moving pointer.” (p.400) In following the moving hand on the clock Dasein is engaged in a making present which both awaits the “then” (is open for the horizon of the later, that is, now-not-yet) and retains the “on that former occasion” (is open for the horizon of the earlier, that is, the now-no-longer). “*What shows itself in this making present is time*.” (p.400)

In this mode of making present the “nows” are counted. “And they show themselves “in every now” as “right-away-no-longer-now” and “just-now-not-yet.” The world time “caught sight of” in this way in the use of the clock we shall call *now-time*.” (p.401)

This mode of taking care of time which “reckons with time” eventually loses sight of time and Dasein becomes “lost in the useful things taken care of... thus time shows itself for the vulgar understanding as a succession of constantly “present” nows that pass away and arrive at the same time.” (p.401)

What does this interpretation of world time taken care of imply? “In the vulgar interpretation of time as a succession of nows, both datability and significance are *lacking*… The vulgar interpretation of time *covers* them *over*. The ecstatic and horizonal constitution of temporality… is *levelled down* by this covering over.” (p.401) World also becomes covered over because the succession of nows are seen in a way that discloses them as something somehow objectively present; something which moves “in time”.

“The main thesis of the vulgar interpretation of time – namely, that time is “infinite” – reveals most penetratingly the levelling down and covering over of world time and thus of temporality in general belonging to this interpretation.” (p.403) If time is seen as a succession of nows, it follows that every now is both a now-no-longer and a now-not-yet automatically yielding an infinity in both directions. But, “[t]his thesis about time is possible only on the basis of an orientation *toward a free-floating in-itself of a course of nows objectively present*, whereby the complete phenomenon of the now is covered over with regard to the datability, worldliness, spannedness, and publicness of Dasein” (p.403).

This levelling down of world time and covering over of temporality is grounded in the Being of Dasein, that is, care. “Thrown and entangled, Dasein is initially and for the most part lost in what it takes care of.” (p.403)

In seeing how temporality is the ground for the vulgar interpretation of time Heidegger calls temporality *primordial time* and summarises it thus; “Ecstatic and horizonal temporality temporalizes itself *primarily* out of the *future*. However, the vulgar understanding of time sees the fundamental phenomenon of time in the *now*, and indeed in the sheer now, cut off in its complete structure, that is called the “present.”” (p.405)